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Public Fora Purpose: Analyzing 
Viewpoint Discrimination on the 
President’s Twitter Account 
James M. LoPiano* 
Today, protectable speech takes many forms in many spaces. 
This Note is about the spaces. This Note discusses whether 
President Donald J. Trump’s personal Twitter account functions 
as a public forum, and if so, whether blocking constituents from 
said account amounts to viewpoint discrimination—a First 
Amendment freedom of speech violation. Part I introduces the core 
legal devices and doctrines that have developed in freedom of 
speech jurisprudence relating to issues of public fora. Part II 
analyzes whether social media generally serves as public fora, 
whether the President’s personal Twitter account is a public 
forum, and whether his recent habit of blocking constituents from 
that account amounts to viewpoint discrimination. In doing so, 
Part II also addresses the applicability of the recent decision from 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 
Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors—wherein a 
local county government official was held to have engaged in 
viewpoint discrimination for banning a constituent from her 
personal social media account—to the Knight First Amendment 
Institute at Columbia University’s pending case against the 
President for the same. Part III then suggests multiple approaches 
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Stony Brook University, 2013. I would like to thank Professors Olivier Sylvain and Ron 
Lazebnik for their thoughts and guidance during the writing process, and their patience 
with my many questions concerning this area of the law. I would also like to thank the 
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encouragement, insightful feedback, and updates on the pending litigation against the 
President during the publication process. 
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for courts to analyze these claims, while taking account of an 
analytical mismatch that occurs when trying to apply the Davison 
case to the case brought against the President. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since his inauguration on January 20, 2017,1 the forty-fifth 
President of the United States of America, Donald J. Trump,2 has 
used his Twitter3 account4 “@realDonaldTrump” to communicate 
with constituents across the nation.5 Six months later, the question 
arose whether the President’s frequent use of his personal Twitter 
account rendered that account a public forum,6 and if so, whether 
blocking constituents critical of him from @realDonaldTrump 
amounts to viewpoint discrimination7—a First Amendment 
Freedom of Speech violation.8 
On July 11, 2017, this issue was brought before the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York in Knight 
First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump.9 The 
                                                                                                             
1 See Donald Trump’s Presidential Inauguration: Order of the Day, BBC  
(Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38668834 [https://perma.cc/ 
FWZ5-WWY4]. 
2 See id. 
3 TWITTER, https://twitter.com/?lang=en [https://perma.cc/K7RY-W3EL] (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2017). Twitter is a social media website that allows users to share news, pictures, 
messages, video, links, and other media by publishing that information to their personal 
accounts with the service. See Paul Gil, What Is Twitter and How Does It Work?, 
LIFEWIRE (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.lifewire.com/what-exactly-is-twitter-2483331 
[https://perma.cc/G2S4-CAB3]. 
4 The Author uses the term “account” loosely throughout the Note to refer to a 
particular Internet user’s customized webpage or website on a social media platform, as 
well as their preferences and settings for those platforms. 
5 See generally Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump [https://perma.cc/G6BT-2AM2] (last visited Dec. 
14, 2017). See infra I.C.2 Section (discussing briefly the President’s @POTUS account 
versus his personal Twitter account). 
6 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 24, Knight First Amendment 
Inst. at Colum. Univ. v. Trump, 1:17-cv-05205 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2017). 
7 See id. 
8 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) 
(“When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers 
on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant. Viewpoint 
discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The government must 
abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or 
perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.” (citations omitted)). 
9 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 6. This case is still 
pending before the district court. 
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Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University10 (the 
“Knight Institute”) filed a complaint against the President alleging 
that he violated the First Amendment rights of Twitter users when 
he blocked them from his “@realDonaldTrump” account.11 In its 
complaint on behalf of those blocked,12 Knight Institute alleged 
that by targeting those critical of him in “tweets,”13 and 
subsequently blocking them, the President engaged in viewpoint 
discrimination.14 While this case was still only beginning,15 
                                                                                                             
10 About the Knight Institute, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST., 
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/about-knight-institute [https://perma.cc/848W-6TAH] 
(last visited Feb. 1, 2018). The Knight Institute is academic legal group that commits 
itself to research and tactical litigation aimed at protecting and enhancing First 
Amendment rights in the new digital technology environment. See id. 
11 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 6, at 24. 
12 Seven plaintiffs are listed in the complaint. See id. at 3–4. These include: (1) 
Rebecca Buckwalter—journalist and legal analyst—blocked from the President’s Twitter 
account soon after reply tweeting that Russia won the White House for him, see id. at 17; 
(2) Philip Cohen—sociology professor at the University of Maryland—blocked fifteen 
minutes after reply tweeting the President’s photograph with the words “Corrupt 
Incompetent Authoritarian” superimposed over it, id. at 18; (3) Holly Figueroa—national 
political organizer and songwriter—blocked the same day she reply tweeted a photograph 
of the Pope looking angrily at the President, with words stating “[t]his is pretty much how 
the whole world sees you,” id. at 19; (4) Eugene Gu—resident surgeon at the Vanderbilt 
University Medical Center and CEO of Ganogen Research Institute—blocked 
approximately two hours after reply tweeting “[t]he same guy who doesn’t proofread his 
Twitter handles the nuclear button,” id. at 20; (5) Brandon Neely—2003 Iraq veteran, 
former Guantanamo Bay guard, and current Texan police officer—blocked the day after 
reply tweeting “[c]ongrats and now black lung won’t be covered under #TrumpCare” in 
response to the President’s tweet, congratulating Pennsylvania on the opening of a new 
coal mine, id. at 21; (6) Joseph Papp—author, anti-doping advocate, and former 
professional road cyclist—blocked the day after reply tweeting “[w]hy didn’t you attend 
your #PittsburghNotParis rally in DC, Sir?,” id. at 22; and (7) Nick Pappas—comic and 
writer—blocked the same day he alleged that courts are protecting us from the President 
in a tweet replying to the President’s tweet calling the courts “slow and political,”  
id. at 22–23. 
13 “Tweets” are character-limited messages and posts that Twitter users publish to their 
Twitter account pages. See Jonathan Strickland & Nathan Chandler, What are Tweets?, 
Section of How Twitter Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, https://computer.howstuffworks.com/
internet/social-networking/networks/twitter1.htm [https://perma.cc/M9UN-9SGX] (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2018). “Reply tweeting,” “reply tweeted,” and “reply tweets” are all the 
Author’s reference to the Twitter function that allows Twitter users to reply to another 
user’s tweets with their own messages and posts. See How to Reply to a Tweet on Twitter, 
wikiHow, https://www.wikihow.com/Reply-to-a-Tweet-on-Twitter [https://perma.cc/
9672-G3HR] (last visited Feb. 1, 2018). 
14 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 6, at 1 (“In an effort 
to suppress dissent in this forum [Twitter], Defendants [Donald J. Trump, Sean M. 
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another federal court decision was decided within the past year, 
taking up the same issue as the Trump case, albeit on a  
smaller scale.16 
In Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors,17 a 
constituent of Loudoun County, Virginia, alleged the Chair of the 
Loudoun County Board of Supervisors (“Chairwoman”) violated 
his First Amendment rights when she blocked him from her 
personal Facebook account.18 The U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia held: (1) the Chairwoman’s use of the 
account as a government tool rendered it a public forum; and (2) 
the Chairwoman violated the constituent’s freedom of speech 
rights because her motive in blocking him was to silence his 
criticism of her and the government body she headed, in replies to 
her posts on Facebook, wherein she invited her constituents to 
speak on local government matters.19 The district court cited the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Packingham v. North 
Carolina, as well as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit’s 2008 decision in Page v. Lexington County School 
District One, for the proposition that the government can open a 
                                                                                                             
Spicer, (former) White House Press Secretary, and Daniel Scavino, White House Director 
of Social Media and Assistant to the President,] have excluded—‘blocked’—Twitter 
users who have criticized the President or his policies. This practice [viewpoint 
discrimination] is unconstitutional, and this suit seeks to end it.”); see also infra Section 
I.B (explaining what viewpoint discrimination is and its importance as a First 
Amendment violation). 
15 See Knight Institute v. Trump — Lawsuit Challenging President Trump’s Blocking 
of Critics on Twitter, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST., https://knightcolumbia.org/content/
knight-institute-v-trump-lawsuit-challenging-president-trumps-blocking-critics-twitter 
[https://perma.cc/9RZU-KECV] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (showing progress of 
litigation timeline and latest major action as “White House’s summary judgment motion 
to dismiss the lawsuit” on October 13, 2017). 
16 See infra notes 17–22 and accompanying text. 
17 267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. 2017). 
18 See id. at 706. 
19 See id. at 716–17 (“[T]he record demonstrates that Defendant engaged in viewpoint 
discrimination by banning Plaintiff from her Facebook page.”). The defendant’s motive 
in banning constituents can be all-important in a viewpoint discrimination claim given 
that viewpoint discrimination requires one to censor speech on the basis of viewpoint, 
rather than some other criteria, such as relevance, content, or inappropriateness. See infra 
Section I.B.1 for a full discussion of viewpoint discrimination related to other applicable 
free speech doctrine. 
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public forum on a social media site.20 Having found the 
Chairwoman’s Facebook account was rendered a public forum, the 
district court held that by blocking her constituent’s critical 
viewpoint of her administration in that public forum, she had 
violated that constituent’s First Amendment rights.21 Similarly, the 
President blocked constituents from his personal social media 
platform for criticizing him and his administration.22 In light of 
this, the Davison decision now begs the question whether the same 
result could be obtained when the defendant is, rather than a 
county politician, none other than the President. 
The issue of politicians blocking users is not limited to the 
Davison and Trump cases. Currently, there is a host of complaints 
lodged against politicians that blocked Internet users from their 
social media accounts. For example, Kentucky Governor Matt 
Bevin, Maine Governor Paul LePage, Maryland Governor Larry 
Hogan, and Miami Beach Mayor Philip Levine, were all recently 
sued for blocking constituents from either their Facebook or 
Twitter accounts.23 At the heart of these complaints is the same 
question addressed in Davison and pending in Trump: Whether 
social media accounts generally serve as public fora,24 and if so, 
                                                                                                             
20 See Davison, 267 F. Supp. at 716. 
21 See id. at 71617. 
22 The President does not contest that he blocked the Knight Institute case plaintiffs 
because they criticized him on Twitter. See Stipulation at 1, Knight First Amendment 
Inst. at Colum. Univ. v. Trump, No. 17-cv-05205 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2017). 
23 See Natt Garun, ACLU Sues Maine’s Governor for Deleting Facebook Comments 
and Blocking Users, VERGE (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/8/8/
16114636/aclu-lawsuit-maine-governor-facebook-blocking-deleting-comments-free-
speech [https://perma.cc/4L2L-5S5P]; Brittany Shammas, Miami Beach Mayor Philip 
Levine Sued for Blocking Critics on Social Media, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Oct. 10, 2016), 
http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/miami-beach-mayor-philip-levine-sued-for-
blocking-critics-on-social-media-8837410 [https://perma.cc/CD8R-N9CP]; Morgan 
Watkins & Phillip M. Bailey, Kentuckians Sue Gov. Matt Bevin for Blocking Them on 
Twitter and Facebook, COURIER J. (July 31, 2017), http://www.courier-journal.com/story/
news/2017/07/31/kentuckians-sue-gov-matt-bevin-blocking-them-twitter-and-facebook/
519427001/ [https://perma.cc/ZT3Y-KPJX]; Brian Witte, ACLU Sues Maryland 
Governor Over Social Media Blocking, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 1, 2017), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/maryland/articles/2017-08-01/aclu-sues-
maryland-governor-over-social-media-blocking [https://perma.cc/5JN6-GQE9]. 
24 The term “fora” is used throughout this Note as the plural form of the word “forum.” 
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whether blocking constituents from a government official’s 
account is a violation of those constituents’ freedom of speech.25 
Considering the current combative political climate on social 
media,26 how meritorious are these claims against the President? 
Barack Obama’s successful election as the forty-fourth President 
of the United States was famously attributed, at least in part, to his 
skillful use of the social media platform Facebook to get his 
message across to online audiences.27 His use of his own Facebook 
account to deliver political posts about his candidacy across the 
Internet seemed to mark the beginning of this now-popular trend 
among candidates for political office.28 Similarly, the current 
                                                                                                             
25 Compare Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 6, at 1–2, 24, 
and Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716–17, with Garun, supra note 23, Shammas, supra 
note 23, Watkins & Bailey, supra note 23, and Witte, supra note 23. 
26 Social media has arguably enflamed divisiveness in contemporary American politics 
between the left and right of the political spectrum. For example, Harvard’s Berkman 
Klein Center found that “[d]isproportionate popularity on Facebook is a strong indicator 
of highly partisan and unreliable media.” ROBERT FARIS ET AL., BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR 
INTERNET & SOC’Y AT HARVARD UNIV., RESEARCH PUB. NO. 2017-6, PARTISANSHIP, 
PROPAGANDA, AND DISINFORMATION: ONLINE MEDIA AND THE 2016 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION 15 (2017). This seems to indicate that the most widely shared and liked 
political posts on Facebook cater to extreme or exaggerated political information and 
viewpoints. See id. Corroborating this notion, in 2016, the Pew Research Center found 
“[m]ore than one-third of social media users are worn out by the amount of political 
content they encounter, and more than half describe their online interactions with those 
they disagree with politically as stressful and frustrating.” MAEVE DUGGAN & AARON 
SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT ON SOCIAL MEDIA 3 (2016). If 
more than one-third of social media users are worn out by the volume of political content 
they see on social media, it stands to reason that the volume of political content on social 
media is substantial. See id. The fact that more than half of social media users are 
frustrated by disagreements in casual online political discourse shows how emotionally 
charged these disagreements really are. See id. 
27 See David Carr, How Obama Tapped into Social Network’s Power, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 9, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/business/media/10carr.html 
[https://perma.cc/78U4-Y9VB]. See generally Jennifer Aaker & Victoria Chang, Obama 
and the Power of Social Media and Technology, EUR. BUS. REV., May–June 2010, at 16–
21, https://people.stanford.edu/jaaker/sites/default/files/tebrmay-june-obama.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XAR8-TMPE] (explaining how Obama’s innovative approach to 
campaigning through social media and email campaigns benefitted his election). 
28 See, e.g., Aaker & Chang, supra note 27, at 20 (“Obama changed the way elections 
were run and would be run in the future. He and his team showed the power of social 
media and technology . . . .”); Madeline McDowell, Does Twitter Play Too Much of a 
Role in the Presidential Election?, LOYOLA UNIV. OF MD.: EMERGING MEDIA 360 (2016), 
https://www.loyola.edu/academics/emerging-media/blog/2016/twitters-role-in-
presidential-election [https://perma.cc/HLQ5-Q7LG] (stating “[w]hen Barack Obama 
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President famously leveraged the use of his own Twitter account to 
“go viral”29 during the election for the forty-fifth president—a 
tactic that the President himself attributed to his overall success in 
getting himself elected.30 
Today, political candidates, both state and federal, from county 
supervisor, to mayor, to governor, to congresswomen and 
congressmen, to senators, and presidents, leverage social media to 
better connect with their constituents.31 They would be crazy not 
to. After all, a huge amount of American political discourse and 
debate takes place across the Internet today.32 Citizens comment 
back and forth on each other’s accounts about their views and 
arguments concerning trending political topics.33 Research 
indicates that political debates and propaganda on social media are 
to blame for deepened political divineness among the general 
                                                                                                             
first ran for President in 2008, utilizing social media as a candidate was not totally 
unheard of, but absolutely not being used as it is now”). 
29 To “go viral” means “[i]f a video, image, or story . . . spreads quickly and widely on 
the Internet through social media and e-mail.” Definition of ‘Go Viral’, 
COLLINSDICTIONARY.COM, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/go-viral 
[https://perma.cc/C2WN-9RWZ] (last visited Apr. 1, 2018). 
30 See Chris Baynes, Donald Trump Says He Would Not Be President Without Twitter, 
INDEPENDENT (Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-
politics/donald-trump-tweets-twitter-social-media-facebook-instagram-fox-business-
network-would-not-be-a8013491.html [https://perma.cc/AB46-B5CZ] (“[The President] 
said: ‘I doubt I would be here if it weren’t for social media, to be honest with you . . . . 
Tweeting is like a typewriter – when I put it out, you put it immediately on your 
show.[’]” (quoting Donald J. Trump)). Scholarship agrees with the President. See, e.g., 
Jacob Marx, Twitter and the 2016 Presidential Election, CRITIQUE: A WORLDWIDE J. 
STUDENT POL., Spring 2017, at 34 (arguing that “Twitter was instrumental in [the 
President’s] successful run”); McDowell, supra note 28 (“Twitter can be seen as a way to 
connect with a candidate just as you’d connect with a friend, it shows and helps maintain 
the authenticity behind a candidate. In the midst of a social media revolution, the social 
media departments behind a candidate are studying memes and how to fit a response into 
140 characters.”). 
31 See, e.g., How Congress Used Social Media in 2017, QUORUM (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://www.quorum.us/data-driven-insights/congress-on-social-media-2017/192/ 
[https://perma.cc/G58C-WFZ4] (“This year the 535 members of Congress have 
collectively posted over [one] million times on social media platforms like Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram, Medium, and YouTube.”); supra notes 23–25 and  
accompanying text. 
32 See generally DUGGAN & SMITH, supra note 26 (discussing the voluminous political 
interactions that take place between those with different political viewpoints on  
social media). 
33 See id. at 2–3. 
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American public,34 with some stating that such divisiveness has 
reached a level not seen since the Civil War.35 Further, the 
organization of rallies and protests have evolved rapidly on social 
media, with citizens creating private and public groups36 to 
introduce, share, and discuss their ongoing political agendas.37 
Political movements, such as “Black Lives Matter,”38 and the 
counter-movements “All Lives Matter”39 and “Blue Lives 
Matter,”40 have social media in part to thank for their successes in 
reaching the mainstream media and the general public.41 
Unpopular views among isolated pockets of constituents, separated 
                                                                                                             
34 See AMY MITCHELL ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., POLITICAL POLARIZATION & MEDIA 
HABITS: FROM FOX NEWS TO FACEBOOK, HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES KEEP UP 
WITH POLITICS 1–2 (2014). 
35 See, e.g., Conor Lynch, America May Be More Divided Now than at Any Time Since 
the Civil War, SALON (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.salon.com/2017/10/14/america-may-
be-more-divided-now-than-at-any-time-since-the-civil-war/  
[https://perma.cc/WWU9-64UU]. 
36 “Groups” are generally virtual communities that enlist members on social media; by 
“public” groups, the Author is referring to those that allow open membership, and by 
“private” groups, the Author is referring to those that allow membership through 
invitation only. See Heidi Thorne, What Are Social Media Groups?, TURBOFUTURE.COM 
(Dec. 14, 2017), https://turbofuture.com/internet/What-are-Social-Media-Groups 
[https://perma.cc/CWC6-VXDL]. 
37 See generally, e.g., Jose Marichal, Political Facebook Groups: Micro-Activism and 
the Digital Front Stage, FIRST MONDAY (Dec. 2, 2013), http://firstmonday.org/article/
view/4653/3800 [https://perma.cc/ZFQ8-MWBD] (going into detail about political 
activism through Facebook groups and how those groups organize and execute  
their agendas). 
38 Black Lives Matter, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/BlackLivesMatter/ 
[https://perma.cc/MT29-NZ83] (last visited Apr. 1, 2018) (showing 321,675 users follow 
this account for updates); Black Lives Matter (@Blklivesmatter), TWITTER, 
https://twitter.com/blklivesmatter?lang=en [https://perma.cc/3R65-Y4FM] (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2018) (showing 285,609 users follow this account for updates). 
39 All Lives Matter Foundation, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
alllivesmatterfoundation/ [https://perma.cc/49Z2-NH8N] (last visited Apr. 1, 2018) 
(showing 3,948 users follow this account for updates); #alllivesmatter, TWITTER, 
https://twitter.com/hashtag/alllivesmatter [https://perma.cc/9A8H-NR48] (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2018). 
40 Blue Lives Matter, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/bluematters/ 
[https://perma.cc/SR67-L5ET] (last visited Apr. 1, 2018) (showing 2,000,715 users 
follow this account for updates); Blue Lives Matter (@bluelivesmtr), TWITTER, 
https://twitter.com/bluelivesmtr?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr
%5Eauthor [https://perma.cc/2P5W-Y2Q3] (last visited Apr. 1, 2018) (showing 34,518 
users follow this account for updates). 
41 See supra notes 38–40. 
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by thousands of miles or overseas, can now connect with each 
other painlessly across the Internet and band together to 
disseminate their viewpoints.42 Social media now provides a 
platform for all views to be expressed—it presses to every political 
camp’s lips, no matter how minor, a digital megaphone for 
speakers to blast their viewpoints across endless and international 
“market squares” of the Internet.43 Even the ongoing federal 
investigation into Russia’s involvement with the President’s 
election has social media as its birthplace,44 where so-called “fake 
news”45 was allegedly spread about political candidates running for 
office.46 All this is to say, social media has ingrained itself into the 
very fabric of American politics, and to ignore the part it plays 
there is to do social media a great disservice. 
Until the Supreme Court weighs in, it is unclear how claims of 
viewpoint discrimination on government officials’ social media 
accounts will shape future First Amendment jurisprudence. 
Additionally, until the Southern District of New York decides the 
Trump case, which could possibly then go up on appeal to the U.S. 
                                                                                                             
42 See The Internet: Bringing People Together Virtually or Pushing Them Away 
Physically, STANFORD UNIV., https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/cs181/projects/2000-
01/personal-lives/debate.html [https://perma.cc/YBR7-3WB7] (last visited Apr. 1, 2018). 
43 See supra notes 32–33, 36–42 and accompanying text. 
44 See Indictment at 3, United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, No. 1:18-cr-
00032-DLF (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018) (“Beginning as early as 2014, Defendant 
ORGANIZATION began operations to interfere with the U.S. political system, including 
the 2016 U.S. presidential election . . . . Defendants, posing as U.S. persons and creating 
false U.S. personas, operated social media pages and groups designed to attract U.S. 
audiences. These groups and pages, which addressed divisive U.S. political and social 
issues, falsely claimed to be controlled by U.S. activists when, in fact, they were 
controlled by Defendants.”). 
45 “Fake news” is a term that has become increasingly popular following Donald J. 
Trump’s election to the presidential seat. See Cristiano Lima, Poll: [Seventy-Seven] 
Percent Say Major News Outlets Report ‘Fake News’, POLITICO (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/02/poll-fake-news-494421 
[https://perma.cc/9HSK-LW3Q]. “Fake news” means many things to different people, but 
essentially boils down to media reporting that spreads misinformation or misleading 
coverage based on an underlying political agenda. See id. 
46 See Indictment, supra note 44, at 4 (“Defendant ORGANIZATION had a strategic 
goal to sow discord in the U.S. political system, including the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election. Defendants posted derogatory information about a number of candidates, and by 
early to mid-2016, Defendants’ operations included supporting the presidential campaign 
of then-candidate Donald J. Trump (‘Trump Campaign’) and disparaging  
Hillary Clinton.”). 
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decides the pending Davison 
appeal,47 we must wait and see if the two cases will eventually set 
the stage for a new circuit split on the issue. 
Social media has inescapably wedged itself into the annals of 
history: It is used by a majority of Americans,48 and forms the 
basis for an untold number of social and cultural commentary and 
discussions on topics ranging from what one ate for dinner the 
night before,49 to what parks and streets a local protest is going to 
occur in that weekend.50 Social media has revitalized the political 
landscape and, further, reshaped that landscape to reflect the 
technology of the modern era.51 This is so much so that now at 
least forty-six states’ governors have savvied up and begun to use 
Twitter to connect more with their constituents.52 
In analyzing these issues, Part I of this Note opens with an 
introduction to the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of 
speech, and then explores the various protections and exceptions 
that shape how the law interacts with this freedom in government 
or state-sponsored public spaces. Next, Part II discusses, first, 
whether social media overall generally serve as public fora. 
                                                                                                             
47 Both the Chairwoman and constituent appealed the decision of the Eastern District 
of Virginia. See Case Docket No. 1:16-CV-00932-JCC-IDD, available at Westlaw. 
48 See Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/ [https://perma.cc/3KNP-WWSN] 
(noting that sixty-seven percent of Americans use at least some social media). 
49 See Aleksandra Atanasova, The Psychology of Foodstagramming, SOCIAL MEDIA 
TODAY (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.socialmediatoday.com/social-networks/psychology-
foodstagramming [https://perma.cc/DXA6-AWQF] (“Data from digital marketing agency 
360i shows that [twenty-five percent] of food photos are motivated by the need to 
document our day for the public.”). 
50 Cf. The Role of Social Media in Accelerating a Revolution, SOL PRICE SCH. PUB. 
POL’Y, https://publicadmin.usc.edu/resources/infographics/the-role-of-social-media-in-
accelerating-a-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/WK89-A8T5] (last visited Apr. 17, 2018) 
(“Participants and planners use social sites like Twitter to spread the word about 
upcoming protests, making it easier to gain supporters.”). 
51 See generally id. (discussing how social media users have integrated social 
platforms into their political routines and education). 
52 By 2013, the only states whose governors were not on Twitter were Indiana, North 
Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Jimmy Daly & Anita Ferrer, Social Leaders: 
The Complete List of State Governors on Twitter, STATETECH (Jan. 16, 2013), 
https://statetechmagazine.com/article/2013/01/complete-list-state-governors-twitter 
[https://perma.cc/3KNJ-39C5]. 
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Second, Part II analyzes whether the President’s personal Twitter 
account serves as a public forum. Part II then continues to discuss 
whether, if in fact the President’s personal Twitter account serves 
as a public forum, the President can violate the First Amendment 
by banning constituents critical of him from that account. Part II 
finally concludes with how the Davison court’s analysis, 
concerning a county politician’s similar action, cannot be 
replicated to fit the Trump case, although the factors it enunciated 
in its decision remain applicable. Finally, in Part III, the Author 
provides several suggestions for hurdling the analytical divide 
between the Davison case’s analysis and the approach the Trump 
case must take when answering the question whether the President 
acted in his governmental, rather than personal, capacity when he 
blocked constituents from his account. 
I. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE: A QUESTION OF  
SPEAKER AND SPACES 
This Part explores First Amendment freedom of speech 
jurisprudence as it applies to public and personal or private 
spaces.53 Specifically, it examines free speech’s metamorphosis 
into a shield against a concept called “viewpoint discrimination.”54 
It then explains the public forum doctrine and the differences 
between traditional public fora, designated public fora, limited 
public fora, and nonpublic fora. Next, it highlights the various 
limitations on freedom of speech, including reasonable time, place, 
or manner restrictions, speech with little to no social value, and the 
                                                                                                             
53 The Author refers to the terms “space,” “public,” “personal,” and “private” 
throughout this Note. In doing so, the Author is using his own definitions: “Space” is 
used in the sense of both the physical (i.e., spaces that a person can physically enter their 
body into) and metaphysical (i.e., spaces that are digital or two-dimensional); “public” 
spaces are those that are opened for the purpose of general public use by either a 
governmental or private body (e.g., parks, streets, campuses, newspapers, social media 
platforms, etc.); “personal” spaces are those that belong to a private person or entity and 
are by default reserved to the use of that person or entity, but which from time to time 
may be opened to the public; “private” spaces are those that belong to a private person or 
entity and are decidedly reserved to the use of that person or entity, with individual 
exceptions made occasionally for other private persons or entities to use that space after 
securing that private person or entity’s affirmative, as opposed to default, permission. 
54 See infra Section I.B.1. 
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government speech doctrine. Finally, it ends by highlighting color 
of speech doctrine and its importance to the Eastern District of 
Virginia decision in Davison. 
A. The First Amendment & Freedom of Speech 
The constitutional right to freedom of speech55 originates in the 
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, ratified as part of the 
Bill of Rights on December 15, 1791,56 which states: “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”57 The First Amendment has since formed the basis for 
a constitutional jurisprudence on citizens’ right to freedom of 
speech, a federal right extended to the states through the Due 
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.58 
Not all speech is protected under the First Amendment. Speech 
“of such slight social value as a step to truth”—because it actually 
works against, rather than for, enhancing public discussion—that it 
is “clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality” 
is not protected.59 This is a byproduct of the notion that truth is a 
product of those ideas that survive challenges faced in an open 
                                                                                                             
55 What qualifies as “speech” for First Amendment protection goes well beyond verbal 
communication, including art, pamphlets, newspapers, the act of spending, and other 
forms of expression, so long as it communicates a message of the speaker. See generally 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (protecting 
student newspapers as speech and recognizing government funding as speech); Se. 
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (protecting a play’s content as speech). 
56 See The Bill of Rights: A Transcription, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/
founding-docs/bill-of-rights-transcript#toc-the-preamble-to-the-bill-of-rights 
[https://perma.cc/568D-GY3J ] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017). 
57 U.S. CONST. amend. I. (emphasis added). 
58 See id. amend. XIV, § 1. (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
59 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). See infra text in notes 
61–65 for examples. 
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marketplace of ideas.60 Speech categories that courts have found 
harm, rather than enhance, discussions for the pursuit of truth (and 
thus have no benefit to society) include: lewd speech;61 obscene 
speech;62 profane speech;63 libelous speech;64 and insulting speech, 
also referred to as “fighting” words65—and not to be confused with 
political criticism, parody, or satire, which are protected categories 
speech66—“[all of] which by their very utterance inflict injury or 
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”67 This Note refers 
to such categories of speech as “unprotected” speech. In the 
example of the President’s Twitter account, this might include 
reply tweets that essentially amount to cursing out the President, 
threatening him, or that spread unfounded lies about him—all 
without some political context or message to give the speech social 
value promoting the pursuit of truth.68 
As discussed in Section I.B below, even the protection of 
“protected” speech (i.e., speech with a value in the market for 
discerning truth) varies depending upon the type of space in which 
the speech takes place (i.e., the type of “forum”). The public forum 
doctrine forms a gradient barrier for speech protection against 
government intervention across various types of spaces, not by 
whether they are physical or metaphysical, but rather dependent 
                                                                                                             
60 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market.”); see also supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
61 See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (holding 
lewd speech without political viewpoint unprotected by the First Amendment). 
62 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 288 (2008) (“We have long held 
that obscene speech—sexually explicit material that violates fundamental notions of 
decency—is not protected by the First Amendment.”). 
63 See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256–57 (1952) (noting that the 
prevention of “profane” speech was never thought to raise a constitutional problem). 
64 See, e.g., id. at 266 (“Libelous utterances [are] not . . . within the area of 
constitutionally protected speech.”). 
65 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–73 (1942) (holding so-
called “fighting words,” speech likely to provoke violence, unworthy of  
constitutional protection). 
66 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 49–57 (1988) (holding First 
Amendment protections apply to political parody, satire, and criticism, even under tort 
damages claim). 
67 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
68 See id. 
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upon their public, or personal or private, character.69 This gradient 
has continued to develop alongside technology.70 Even old dogs 
such as traditional public fora are continuously being affected by 
advancements in technology.71 As younger generations begin to 
more frequently use social media to organize, meet, and plan for 
protests and rallies in their local streets and parks as their 
forefathers did before them, they now do so with their cell phones, 
laptops, high-tech cameras, and GPS in tow, tracking their political 
movements, and those of their participants, along the way.72 The 
constitutional freedom of speech right has matured over the years, 
growing within new pockets of speech law in areas of 
technological advancement as courts continue to shape the 
contours of new speech doctrine.73 
B. Public Forum Doctrine: A Gradient of Speech Protection 
Public forum doctrine governs First Amendment free speech 
jurisprudence concerning the treatment of speech in both physical 
and metaphysical public spaces.74 In 1939, the Supreme Court first 
articulated the First Amendment’s protection of speech in public 
                                                                                                             
69 See infra Section I.B (discussing how different levels of protection are afforded to 
traditional, versus designated, versus limited, versus nonpublic fora). 
70 See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 670–71, 676 
(1998) (holding a live televised debate “was a nonpublic forum, from which [the 
broadcaster] could exclude [a relatively unpopular candidate] in the reasonable, 
viewpoint-neutral exercise of its journalistic discretion.”); see also Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 315 (2010) (“Rapid changes in technology—and 
the creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expression—counsel against 
upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers.”). 
71 See, e.g., The Role of Social Media in Accelerating a Revolution, supra note 50 
(noting the various ways technology is used to enhance the visibility and organization of 
protests); see also infra Section I.C.1 (explaining how traditional public forum doctrine 
typically protects speech where protests are held). 
72 See, e.g., The Role of Social Media in Accelerating a Revolution, supra note 50. 
73 Compare Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n, 523 U.S. 666 (deciding on freedom of 
speech issues relating to televised broadcasting of live debates as public fora), with 
Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. 2017) 
(deciding on freedom of speech issues relating to politician’s social media website as a 
public forum). 
74 See supra note 53; see also infra Sections I.C.1–4 (discussing the different kinds of 
spaces protected) and notes 169–70 and accompanying text (discussing newspapers and 
license plates as metaphysical spaces). 
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fora. In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organizations,75 
citizens belonging to the Committee for Industrial Organization 
(“CIO”) sued the Mayor of Jersey City, New Jersey, among other 
state officials,76 after officials forcibly removed their members 
from public property for attempting to pass out written material in 
the city and set up meetings to discuss the National Labor 
Relations Act.77 Justice Robert Owens, speaking for the Supreme 
Court, stated in dicta that “the use of the streets and public places” 
had “from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, 
rights, and liberties of citizens.”78 He found that citizens 
communicating their political views and agendas in these spaces 
could be regulated by the government, but only relative to the need 
to preserve the rights of others, the general peace, and to prevent 
chaos.79 Those regulations could not be a product of government 
abuse against otherwise permissible protest.80 It has been argued 
that Justice Owens’s opinion in Hague has since formed the basis 
for the public forum doctrine,81 which recognizes a balance 
between citizens’ traditional right to congregate in public spaces to 
speak out on political matters, and the interest of the government in 
managing its property.82 
This balance was further articulated in Lehman v. City of 
Shaker Heights,83 where the Supreme Court pointed out that the 
“nature of the forum” and other interests involved—such as the 
government’s, and individuals’, interest in using their property84—
                                                                                                             
75 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
76 See id. at 500–03 
77 See id. 
78 Id. at 515–16. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. 
81 See, e.g., Ross Rinehart, Note, “Friending” and “Following” the Government: How 
the Public Forum and Government Speech Doctrines Discourage the Government’s 
Social Media Presence, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 781, 791 n.54 (2013) (citing multiple 
academics arguing for Hague’s place as the proper starting point for the public forum 
doctrine, but noting at least one skeptic). 
82 See id. at 792. 
83 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (emphasis added). 
84 See id. at 317 (noting that restrictions on speech must be “narrowly tailored to 
protect the government’s substantial interest in preserving the viability and utility of the 
forum itself.”); see also supra note 82 and accompanying text; infra notes 116–21 and 
accompanying text. 
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were integral to “the degree of protection afforded” to protected 
speech.85 Since Hague, First Amendment jurisprudence has 
recognized at least four kinds of fora, each with their own 
respective characteristics and varying levels of protection for 
speech: (1) the traditional public forum;86 (2) the designated public 
forum;87 (3) the limited public forum;88 and (4) the  
nonpublic forum.89 
Examining the different types of fora available, both public and 
nonpublic, is useful for understanding the distinctions between the 
kinds of spaces that the First Amendment protects.90 However, it is 
also important to stress that, for the purposes of viewpoint 
discrimination analysis, the type of forum matters less, for 
viewpoint discrimination against protectable speech91 is prohibited 
in all public fora.92 Therefore, aside from the discussion in Section 
I.B.1, which also introduces the concepts of content discrimination, 
viewpoint discrimination, reasonable time, place, or manner 
restrictions, and strict scrutiny review, the various types of fora are 
only briefly addressed for their characteristics and the level of 
protection they afford. Again, this is so that readers have a better 
sense of what constitutes a protectable space for speech versus a 
purely private space, and all the gradient spaces in between.93 
                                                                                                             
85 See id. at 302–03 (emphasis added). 
86 See infra Section I.B.1. 
87 See infra Section I.B.2. 
88 See infra Section I.B.3. 
89 See infra Section I.B.4. 
90 By examining the different characteristics of the varying types of fora, it is easier to 
describe the President’s Twitter account in terms of First Amendment free  
speech jurisprudence. 
91 See supra Section I.A (discussing unprotectable types of speech). 
92 Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. Five, 470 F.3d 1062, 
1067 n.2 (4th Cir. 2006) (“The ‘viewpoint discrimination’ prohibited in all fora is ‘an 
egregious form of content discrimination’ in which the government ‘targets not subject 
matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject.’” (citing Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995))). 
93 For examples of private spaces that do not protect against viewpoint discrimination, 
think of circumstances where the government or a public entity or utility is uninvolved in 
hosting guest speech—such as private homes and stores. See, e.g., People v. Bush, 349 
N.E.2d 832, 839 (N.Y. 1976) (“One aspect of the balance sought to be attained concerns 
the circumstances under which private property may be utilized for picketing activity, for 
‘[i]t is, of course, a commonplace that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a 
guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal[,] or state.’” (quoting Hudgens 
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1. An Introduction to Speech in Spaces: Traditional Public 
Fora, Content & Viewpoint Discrimination, Reasonable 
Time, Place, or Manner Restrictions, & Strict  
Scrutiny Review 
Traditional public fora afford the highest level of protection for 
freedom of speech. They are categorized as those spaces with a 
long American tradition of commitment to public assembly and 
debate, where “State” (i.e., government)94 authority to restrict 
speech is viewed most skeptically.95 This forum essentially 
consists of “streets and parks,” which, since before the American 
Revolution,96 were used for political assembly, debate, and 
discourse.97 Thus, traditional public fora are the poster-child for 
spaces that have been devoted to public speech, debate, and protest 
throughout our history. For this reason, it makes sense to begin the 
discussion of the other doctrines relating to public fora here, where 
public forum protection is strongest, and where the doctrine began. 
This Note then addresses the other individual types of public fora, 
as well as the varying constrictions and protections of public 
speech in other spaces (i.e., fora). 
As Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
famously put it, “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to 
get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”98 This is a 
remarkably American way of describing freedom of speech in 
terms of our capitalistic society: Truth is a product of those ideas 
that can withstand competing arguments and viewpoints; ideas 
                                                                                                             
v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976))); Aluli v. Trusdell, 508 P.2d 1217, 1222 (Haw. 
1973) (holding, in the case of landlord premises, “no state action is involved, which 
denies or infringes the tenant’s right to exercise his First Amendment  
Constitutional rights”). 
94 Note, the capitalized word “State” is generally synonymous with “government” in 
cases where the Supreme Court refers to “State,” as the same First Amendment standard 
is applied to both the federal and the state government through the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process clause. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
95 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
96 See Parliamentary Taxation of Colonies, International Trade, and the American 
Revolution, 1763–1775, Part of Milestones: 1750–1775, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1750-1775/parliamentary-taxation 
[https://perma.cc/5SRE-EQ52] (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
97 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
98 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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with the best logic and evidence behind them—a distillation of 
truth from survival of the fittest speech.99 In other words, the 
pursuit of truth, political or otherwise, depends upon an open 
discourse between groups with differing viewpoints, opinions, and 
ideologies.100 The inverse also holds true: To avoid being captured 
by political speech divorced from logic and evidence, and thus 
truth (i.e., propaganda), individuals need to challenge their inner 
logic and philosophies in the “competition of the market” so they 
can identify flaws in each other’s reasoning and supplement their 
education with opposing viewpoints.101 
In true American form, the Founders of the Constitution 
honored dissention, so that the First Amendment prevents the 
government from banning speech merely because of the 
government’s “disapproval of the ideas expressed.”102 The 
Supreme Court agreed, holding that government restrictions that 
ban speech because of its content are presumptively invalid.103 
Thus, without meeting a high bar of judicial review, called “strict 
scrutiny” review,104 a government—state or federal—cannot 
selectively censor speech it agrees or disagrees with on the basis of 
that speech’s content.105 This concept decries government-
sponsored content discrimination (i.e., propaganda), while still 
allowing speech restrictions in cases where the restriction is 
content-neutral, and thus does not discriminate on the basis  
of content.106 
                                                                                                             
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. 
102 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
103 See id. 
104 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (“Statutes affecting constitutional 
rights must be drawn with ‘precision,’ and must be ‘tailored’ to serve their legitimate 
objectives. And if there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser 
burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater 
interference. If it acts at all, it must choose ‘less drastic means.’” (citations omitted) (first 
quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); then quoting United States v. 
Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967); then quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 
(1969); and then quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)). 
105 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382. 
106 Id. An example of content discrimination might be a case where a local government 
bans all newspapers discussing foreign forms of government or bans television shows 
depicting women in the workplace. An example of content-neutral restrictions might 
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A cousin of the prohibition on content discrimination is 
viewpoint discrimination.107 Viewpoint discrimination is similar to 
content discrimination, except that it prohibits the government 
from censoring a speaker’s speech on the basis of viewpoint, rather 
than on the basis of content.108 To allow the government to censor 
on the basis of viewpoint directly conflicts with the proper 
functioning of the “competition of the market” idea expressed by 
Justice Holmes for distilling truth from speech.109 For example, in 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia,110 
student participants of a university magazine that promoted 
Christianity brought suit against their school for refusing to pay for 
their printing costs, while paying for other magazines’ printing 
costs.111 The basis for the university’s decision was grounded on 
its guidelines, which denied printing funds to magazines based on, 
inter alia, having a religious or political agenda, or a viewpoint that 
would otherwise interfere with the university’s ability to file for 
tax-exempt status.112 The Supreme Court held that because the 
university was a public institution (i.e., a creature of the state), and 
its school newspapers were public spaces (albeit, metaphysical), 
the university’s rule requiring public officials to sift through and 
ban certain content because of the viewpoints expressed in them 
violated students’ freedom of speech.113 
As explained in Rosenberger, the Supreme Court takes a strict 
stance against viewpoint discrimination in public spaces—even 
metaphysical spaces such as newspapers.114 This was so even 
though the university newspaper at issue in Rosenberger was not a 
                                                                                                             
include a case where the same government bans newspapers issued without a vendor 
license or bans all television shows after 5:00 PM. The former bans speech based on the 
content of the newspaper or show, whereas the latter bans speech based on some  
other criteria. 
107 See infra notes 108–13 and accompanying text. 
108 See, e.g., Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. Five, 470 
F.3d 1062, 1067 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen the government opens its property to private 
speech, it may not discriminate based upon the viewpoint of the speaker.”). 
109 See supra text accompanying notes 98–101. 
110 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
111 See id. at 826–27. 
112 Id. at 825. 
113 Id. at 845. 
114 Id. at 828. 
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traditional public forum.115 Nonetheless, the government may 
restrict speech in even traditional public fora by imposing 
reasonable time, place, or manner limitations, so long as they are 
content-neutral and survive strict scrutiny.116 The reasonable time, 
place, or manner doctrine allows the government to impose 
restrictions on speech where that speech is inappropriate or 
otherwise infringes on the protected rights of others.117 The 
Supreme Court explained that such restrictions are necessary 
because certain speech—depending on its time, place, or manner—
can “frustrate legitimate governmental goals.”118 Consider the 
following apt metaphor from the Supreme Court: “No matter what 
its [political] message, a roving sound truck that blares at [two in 
the morning] disturbs neighborhood tranquility.”119 Why would a 
truck driver have to blare its horn in a town full of sleeping citizens 
at that particular time to get its political message across? What 
would that message even be? This logic conforms with the 
reasoning behind why citizens, despite a constitutional freedom of 
speech, and regardless of the political message, cannot shout 
“bomb” on an airplane. Such speech could incite panic and, 
foreseeably, cause serious injury.120 
Reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions are thus one 
type of limitation on freedom of speech in public fora. Thus, even 
if in protest, say, to something the President says on Twitter, a 
truck driver’s loud and persistent honking on a neighborhood street 
(a traditional public forum) in the wee hours of the night may not 
be protected.121 In such a scenario, where there are alternative 
channels for a truck driver to protest, and the goal is not to 
suppress the truck driver’s viewpoint, but rather to enforce the 
content-neutral aim of allowing citizens to sleep in their homes at 
                                                                                                             
115 Compare id. (discussing a university newspaper), with supra notes 94–97 and 
accompanying text (discussing traditional public fora typically consisting of public streets 
and parks). 
116 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).  
See generally infra notes 122–26 (discussing strict scrutiny review). 
117 See Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 See id. 
121 See infra notes 116–19 and accompanying text. 
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night, courts are less likely to find impermissible censorship of 
political speech if the government restricts the honking. 
If the government imposes such restrictions on the freedom of 
speech, the restriction is subject to a “strict scrutiny” test—a 
court’s tool for discerning whether a Constitutional violation has 
occurred because of government regulation.122 The strict scrutiny 
test is the highest bar to pass for any government restriction on 
speech, requiring the government to show why the restriction is 
both necessary and cannot be accomplished in a less restrictive 
way.123 The test is broken into two parts, determining both: (1) 
whether the government has a compelling interest for the 
restrictive law; and (2) whether that law was narrowly tailored to 
the interest at hand.124 “Narrowly tailored” means: (1) that the law 
is neither over-inclusive (i.e., is only as restrictive as necessary to 
achieve the government’s compelling interest) nor under-inclusive 
(i.e., actually achieves the compelling interest);125 and (2) 
sufficiently permits the speech to be heard through alternate 
means.126 Note, while this may lead to a scenario where a 
reasonable restriction on content may be imposed, based on a 
compelling government interest (e.g., trucks honking on a public 
street at two in the morning, or shouting “bomb” on an airplane), 
                                                                                                             
122 Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1273 
(2007) (“In modern constitutional law, the term ‘strict scrutiny’ refers to a test under 
which statutes will be pronounced unconstitutional unless they are ‘necessary’ or 
‘narrowly tailored’ to serve a ‘compelling governmental interest.’” (citing Johnson v. 
California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995))). 
123 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); 
Fallon, Jr., supra note 122, at 1332–33 (“The Supreme Court . . . frequently presents the 
strict scrutiny inquiry as if it possessed two discrete parts. First, has the government 
defended a challenged regulation by referring to the need to protect a genuinely 
compelling interest? Second, if so, is the challenged regulation narrowly tailored to that 
interest in the sense of being neither under- nor overinclusive?”); see also Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972). 
124 See Fallon, Jr., supra note 122, at 1332–33. 
125 See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The 
Government may . . . regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to 
promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means [i.e., is not over-
inclusive] to further the articulated interest [i.e., is not under-inclusive].”). 
126 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) 
(“[R]estrictions of this kind are valid provided that they . . . leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication of the information.”). 
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discrimination based on viewpoint is not a compelling government 
interest for courts.127 
2. Designated Public Fora 
Designated public fora are spaces that could initially be 
described as private property, but which are then, by virtue of the 
government, opened up to the public to allow public speech and 
expression.128 Examples include places such as university 
facilities,129 school board meetings,130 and town theaters.131 Thus, 
unlike the traditional public forum, the designated public forum 
consists of property not open to the public by default, but by virtue 
of their having been designated a public space by  
the government.132 
Designated public fora offer less protection than traditional 
public fora—public parks and streets—in the sense that the 
government can revert the space back to serving a private purpose 
when it desires.133 This is because the space initially belonged to 
the government, rather than the people.134 However, so long as the 
government offers the designated forum to the general public for 
speech and expression, the space is entitled to the same protections 
as a traditional public forum.135 Thus, strict scrutiny should still 
apply to designated public fora, so long as they are designated as 
                                                                                                             
127 See infra notes 142–44 and accompanying text, and example offered for explanation 
in paragraph text accompanying note 144. 
128 See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45. 
129 See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (holding that a university 
that banned students belonging to a religious group from using its buildings for worship 
and meetings violated free speech rights). 
130 See, e.g., City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisc. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 429 
U.S. 167, 175–76 (1976) (holding it improper to require a board of education to 
discriminate against teachers by prohibiting them from attending a public meeting while 
allowing union representatives to do the same). 
131 See, e.g., Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 561–62 (1975) (holding a 
municipal board’s denial of a theatrical production company’s application to use a city-
leased theater for their play on account of the play’s content improper). 
132 See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45. 
133 See id. (insinuating government restrictions on speech in designated fora need not be 
subject to strict scrutiny review so long as they are not designated as public). 
134 Cf. id. at 46. 
135 See id. 
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open to the public.136 Additionally, even when the designated 
forum is public, reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions—
just as with traditional public fora—are fair game, with the caveat 
that any content-based restrictions still have to pass strict scrutiny 
review.137 This means that, in the case of the President’s Twitter 
account, if that account is designated by the government as public, 
and then later closed for a private purpose, there is no recourse for 
viewpoint discrimination that occurs while the account is kept 
private to the individual. Viewpoint discrimination is not 
prohibited in an individual’s private forum, or social media 
account, so long as that individual is not acting in the role of  
the government.138 
3. Limited Public Fora 
A limited public forum is characterized as a space where “the 
limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created” may 
justify restrictions on speech—even content restrictions—so long 
as they do not discriminate on a basis of viewpoint.139 Thus, this 
type of space may confine speech to specific people and specific 
topics, so long as that was the purpose for which the space was 
created, and that purpose was legitimate.140 In these fora then, the 
government is “like the private owner of property” that opens up 
their property for a specific purpose.141 Once the limited public 
forum is opened, the government must respect its restrictions and 
not discriminate against speech that satisfies the conditions it set 
for participation in the forum.142 This leads to the unique situation 
                                                                                                             
136 See id. 
137 Id. 
138 See supra note 93; see also infra Section I.C.2 (discussing when an individual 
elected to public office is deemed to have acted as the government, rather than  
his or herself). 
139 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
140 See id. Examples might include a government seminar with attendance open to the 
public, but limited by content to discussions on pharmaceuticals, and limited by speaker 
to experts in the industry; or a government chat room dedicated to a public Q&A, with 
discussions limited to, cybersecurity. 
141 See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,  
390 (1993). 
142 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. 
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 804–06 (1985)). 
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where content can be discriminated against, while viewpoint 
discrimination is still prohibited. This is because, regardless of the 
limited topic of discussion (i.e., content restrictions involved) or 
limited set of speakers, the viewpoints of those limited speakers, 
on that limited topic of discussion, are within the lawful bounds the 
government has set, and cannot thus be discriminated against.143 
Take the example of the President’s Twitter account. Let us say 
the President officially opened his Twitter account to the public 
with two limitations in mind that he regularly enforces: (1) the 
topic of discussion is immigration reform; and (2) only users who 
are respected scholars in the field are permitted to discuss the 
issue. Content-based restrictions in that forum on topics dealing 
with issues beyond immigration reform would be permissible 
under the First Amendment.144 Thus, Twitter users posting 
criticism, or anything for that matter, unrelated to immigration 
reform may be blocked from the forum because it was opened for a 
limited purpose—the discussion of immigration reform. 
Additionally, even Twitter users posting comments on his account 
related to immigration reform may be blocked from the account if 
they are not respected scholars in the field. However, any respected 
scholar in the field criticizing the President on his views relating to 
immigration reform, or posting content about immigration reform 
that the President disagrees with, would be protected from having 
their viewpoint on the topic censored (assuming, that is, that the 
President really did intend the forum to be open, just limited to a 
particular discussion). 
Note how, as described above, regardless of the purpose or 
type of forum—whether traditional, designated, or limited—
viewpoint discrimination in a public forum is always prohibited. 
4. Nonpublic Fora 
Nonpublic fora are characterized as “public property which 
[are] not by tradition or designation a forum for public 
                                                                                                             
143 See id. 
144 See id. at 829–30 (“[W]e have observed a distinction between, on the one hand, 
content discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of that 
limited forum, and, on the other hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed 
impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations.”). 
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communication.”145 One example of such a forum is a courthouse 
lobby,146 which is probably used for facilitating court proceedings 
as opposed to public discussion. Protestors may be able to voice 
their concerns on the courthouse steps or the street beside it, but 
the lobby within may justifiably prohibit protest within. These fora 
are thus afforded different gradients of protection from restrictions 
on speech,147 are subject to time, place, or manner regulations,148 
and the government can restrict speech within the forum so long as 
the restriction is reasonable and not a cloaked attempt to silence 
particular viewpoints.149 In other words, the nonpublic forum, 
while by its very nature not intended for public discussion, 
nonetheless presents the possibility that speakers with access to it 
for its intended purposes can bring successful viewpoint 
discrimination claims.150 
While a nonpublic forum may sound similar to a limited public 
forum, the difference lies in that a limited public forum is opened 
by the government to the public for a specific communicative 
purpose, whereas the nonpublic forum can conceivably be opened 
to a private audience for noncommunicative purposes, while still 
remaining subject to viewpoint discrimination.151 While the ability 
of the government to enforce time, place, or manner restrictions is 
expanded,152 viewpoint discrimination retains its presumptive 
invalidity under the First Amendment.153 Using the President’s 
Twitter account again as an example, if the account was password-
protected so that only White House employees could access it for 
work-related purposes, there may be a host of reasonable time, 
place, or manner restrictions. Such restrictions might limit speech 
or expression to work-related activity, certain time periods of the 
                                                                                                             
145 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). 
146 See Gay Guardian Newspaper v. Ohoopee Reg’l Library Sys., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 
1367 (S.D. Ga. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Gay Guardian Newspaper v. Ohoopee Reg’l, 90 F. 
App’x 386 (11th Cir. 2003). 
147 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46. 
148 See infra notes 116–20 and accompanying text. 
149 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46. 
150 See id. 
151 See id. 
152 Namely, because the forum is capable of being private and unconcerned with 
communicative value. 
153 See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46. 
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day when the account could be accessed (such as working hours), 
and the language and decorum of speech on the account could be 
restricted to professional standards. Regardless, any employees 
working within these constraints who are censored because of their 
take on a work-related issue may have a viewpoint  
discrimination claim.154 
C. Government as Speaker 
Speech protections vary considerably when the government 
itself acts as speaker. The first part of this Section discusses when 
the government “speaks” through selective financial assistance to 
entities promoting its goals and through its discretionary rules in 
government license plate programs. The second part of this Section 
discusses when government speech transforms the private spaces 
of its employees into public fora. 
1. Government Speech Doctrine 
Viewpoint discrimination of protectable speech155 retains its 
presumption of invalidity regardless of the type of forum it may 
take place in.156 Nonetheless, the government speech doctrine 
provides an arguable exception to the protection against  
viewpoint discrimination.157 
Government speech doctrine is the concept that when the 
government, as opposed to a citizen, makes protectable (and legal) 
speech, it has the right to protect its own message.158 For speech to 
qualify as government speech, the government must decide the 
overall message of that speech and approve what is used to convey 
it.159 In these situations, the government can protect its speech 
                                                                                                             
154 See id. 
155 Remember, the analysis into different gradients of speech protection in Section I.B 
necessarily assumes first that the speech is the kind protected under the First Amendment. 
See infra Section I.A. 
156 See supra Sections I.B.1–4. 
157 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (“To hold that the Government 
unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a 
program dedicated to advance certain permissible goals, because the program in 
advancing those goals necessarily discourages alternative goals, would render numerous 
Government programs constitutionally suspect.”). 
158 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995). 
159 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005). 
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from being “garbled,” or distorted, by those sponsored by its 
speech, or otherwise appropriating the speech with the  
government’s blessing.160 
Government “speech,” according to the Supreme Court, 
includes, inter alia, when the government funds private entities 
with public monies to disseminate its message.161 This is the mirror 
image of organizations influencing the government through 
lobbying efforts, or of activists pressuring the government through 
social awareness programs; by expending private funds on the 
messages they want to convey to the government, private entities 
get the government to listen, and perhaps, obey.162 Government 
speech is the reverse scenario, where the government influences 
private entities by expending public funds, which may involve a 
government choice concerning which viewpoint it takes on a 
particular topic—abortion, health care, smoking, guns, etc. (i.e., 
what this Author, although not this Note, argues is akin to 
viewpoint discrimination).163 
If the government chooses to disburse funds to health care 
providers that abstain from abortion procedures, and this is a 
legitimate, albeit, legal cause, it may do so.164 The inverse is also 
true: If the government chooses not to support abortions as a policy 
matter, then the government does not have to continue providing 
funds to organizations that promote opposite messages.165 After all, 
the government is providing its sponsorship when it funds private 
organizations, and if those funded organizations are doing exactly 
what the government is fighting against, they distort the 
                                                                                                             
160 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. 
161 Id. 
162 See Resources for Foundations Funding and Supporting Advocacy, BOLDER 
ADVOCACY, https://bolderadvocacy.org/focus-on-foundations/resources-for-foundations-
funding-and-supporting-advocacy [https://perma.cc/R3VM-4RQ7] (last visited  
Feb. 1, 2018). 
163 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. 
164 See id. 
165 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (“When Congress established a National 
Endowment for Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles, 
it was not constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of 
political philosophy such as communism and fascism.” (citations omitted)). 
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government’s mission to the perception of those that recognize the 
government’s partnership with that organization.166 
One of a seminal set of decisions surrounding the government 
speech doctrine, collectively referred to as the Specialty License 
Plate cases, was Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate 
Veterans, Inc.167 This case marked a new distinction in public fora 
jurisprudence, where the Supreme Court held that specially printed 
license plates, although created at the request of individuals, 
constituted government speech and were neither limited nor 
designated public fora.168 Thus, unlike the student newspaper at 
issue in Rosenberger, which the Supreme Court found to be a 
public forum despite its metaphysical, rather than physical, spatial 
qualities,169 the Supreme Court here held that license plates were a 
metaphysical space where speech is reserved to the government.170 
It found so “based on the historical context, observers’ reasonable 
interpretation of the messages conveyed by Texas specialty plates, 
and the effective control that the State exerts over the design 
selection process.”171 The participation of citizens in designing and 
propagating the specialty license plates could not overcome the 
government character reflected by, nor the control exerted over, 
the specialty license plates.172 In so holding, the Supreme Court 
upheld the State of Texas’s right to refuse to print specialty license 
plates depicting Confederate battle flags, namely because of the 
state’s interest in protecting its own expressive content.173 What 
makes this decision so significant, is that the Supreme Court 
allowed Texas to discriminate against Confederate battle flag 
designs (a form of speech) in favor of other designs in its selection 
process.174 Thus, while not directly censoring speech on the basis 
of viewpoint, the government may still favor the speech of one 
                                                                                                             
166 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. 
167 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2243–44 (2015) (dealing with specialty license plate design prints 
requested by Texan citizens and the state government’s role in approving or denying  
certain designs). 
168 See id. at 2250–51. 
169 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830. 
170 See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2251. 
171 Id. 
172 See id. 
173 See id. at 2253–54. 
174 See id. at 2251, 2253–54. 
540      FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVIII:511 
 
speaker over another so long as that speaker’s goals conform with 
its own, even at the detriment to the cause of another  
speaker’s viewpoint.175 
2. Section 1983 and the Color of Law Doctrines176 
The “color of law” doctrine allows plaintiffs in civil rights 
actions to bring claims against government actors that were 
conducting themselves in their public (i.e., professional), as 
opposed to nonpublic (i.e., private), capacities.177 The color of state 
law doctrine deals with claims against state-based officials, and 
originates from title 42 of the U.S. Code, section 1983,178 which 
provides for a civil action against the government for a deprivation 
of rights under the Constitution and U.S. law.179 To state a claim, 
“[o]ne must trace the challenged conduct to the government.”180 
Courts look to the totality of circumstances to determine whether a 
public official, when infringing on the fundamental rights of 
others, was acting in his or her official (i.e., governmental) 
capacity, or as a private citizen.181 
In Davison, the Eastern District of Virginia assessed whether 
Randall, the Chair of the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors, 
was acting in her official capacity as a representative of the 
government, or a private citizen, when she blocked the plaintiff 
constituent from her Facebook account.182 In weighing the totality 
                                                                                                             
175 See supra notes 161–66, 173–74. 
176 Throughout this Note, the Author refers to the color of state law doctrine and the 
color of federal law doctrine collectively and individually. Both of these concepts are 
defined in the Section below. For purposes of clarity, when referring to the “color of law” 
or the “color of law doctrine,” the Author is referring to both collectively. When the 
Author refers to “color of state law” or “color of federal law” doctrine, they are being 
treated separately from their sister doctrine. 
177 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. 
Supp. 3d 702, 712–14 (E.D. Va. 2017). 
178 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
179 See id. 
180 Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d 712. 
181 See id. at 712–14 (quoting Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 527 n.1 (4th Cir. 
2003)). Examples of factors that might appear in a color of state law totality analysis 
necessarily differ depending upon the facts of each case, but for examples in the social 
media context, see infra note 183 and accompanying text. 
182 See id. at 711–14. 
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of the circumstances under the color of state law analysis, the court 
pointed to the following factors: 
Among other things, (1) the title of the page 
includes Defendant’s title; (2) the page is 
categorized as that of a government official; (3) the 
page lists as contact information Defendant’s 
official County email address and the telephone 
number of Defendant’s County office; (4) the page 
includes the web address of Defendant’s official 
County website; (5) many—perhaps most—of the 
posts are expressly addressed to “Loudoun,” 
Defendant’s constituents; (6) Defendant has 
submitted posts on behalf of the Loudoun County 
Board of Supervisors as a whole; (7) Defendant has 
asked her constituents to use the page as a channel 
for “back and forth constituent conversations”; and 
(8) the content posted has a strong tendency toward 
matters related to Defendant’s office.183 
Based on these characteristics of her “personal” social media 
account, the court concluded that Randall’s Facebook account 
activity was primarily a function of her professional (i.e., 
governmental) persona rather than her personal or private persona, 
and held that she acted under color of state law in maintaining her 
Facebook page.184 
The color of state law analysis the Eastern District of Virginia 
employed is applicable to the question of whether the President 
acts in his official governmental or personal capacity when 
maintaining his Twitter account and blocking constituents. 
Notably, the Twitter account at issue in the Trump case is the 
President’s personal @realDonaldTrump account, rather than the 
official President of the United States @POTUS account.185 If the 
viewpoint discrimination at issue in Trump took place on the 
@POTUS account, the analysis of this Note would take a different 
turn. There would be no need to analyze whether there is a 
                                                                                                             
183 See id. at 714. 
184 See id. 
185 See President Trump (@POTUS), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/potus?lang=en 
[https://perma.cc/6RSW-ULWU ] (last visited Mar. 30, 2018). 
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sufficient connection between the private individual account of 
Donald J. Trump, the man, and his position/actions as the 
President, to render the account an “official” public account. The 
only analysis that would take place with respect to the @POTUS 
account is whether social media generally, and Twitter pages in 
particular, are public fora. As addressed in the Introduction, and as 
argued more fully in Section II.A, social media platforms, 
including Twitter pages, are the new public fora. 
In Davison, a public official’s personal Facebook account was 
rendered a public forum. For the most part, the same factors in 
Davison can be checked against the President’s personal Twitter 
page. However, when looking at the actions of a federal official, 
we would presumably look to the color of federal law doctrine 
instead of the color of state law doctrine.186 
Federal officials cannot be liable under the color of state law 
doctrine.187 The color of federal law doctrine is the product of a 
court-created work-around to the prohibition of using the color of 
state law doctrine in civil claims against federal officials for 
damages.188 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics,189 the Supreme Court held for the first time 
that individuals held a private right of action against federal 
officials, acting under color of federal law, for “damages [that] 
may be obtained for injuries consequent upon a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment” (a “Bivens claim”).190 Thus, to qualify for a 
color of federal law claim, a plaintiff must declare both a Fourth 
Amendment violation191 and seek damages.192 Thus, a color of 
                                                                                                             
186 See, e.g., Bender v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 539 F. Supp. 2d 702, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
187 See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 650 (1963) (“[42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985] 
of the Civil Rights Act are clearly inapplicable to this kind of case.”); Duncan v. Goedeke 
& Cleasey, 837 F. Supp. 846, 849 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (“Section 1983 protects persons who 
were deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities under color of state or local law, not 
federal law. Therefore, federal officers acting under color of federal law . . . are not 
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). 
188 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 427–28 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting). 
189 See id. at 395–97 (majority opinion). 
190 See id. at 395. 
191 The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unlawful searches and seizures by 
the government without a warrant:  
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federal law claim is brought under a Fourth, rather than First, 
Amendment claim.193 
Despite this, the Southern District of New York has stated, in a 
Bivens claim for monetary damages against a federal official or 
agent, “[t]o determine whether a defendant has acted under color 
of federal law for purposes of a Bivens action, courts look to the 
more established body of law that defines the analogous term—
under color of state law—with regard to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.”194 Not only is this statement important because it comes 
from the Southern District of New York, where the Knight 
Institute brought suit against the President, but it specifically 
directs the court’s analysis to “the more established body of law” 
under color of state law analysis.195 The Second Circuit, too, has 
recognized that “Courts of Appeals have held that section 1983 
concepts of state action apply in determining whether action was 
taken ‘under color of federal law’ for Bivens purposes.”196 
But does color of federal law apply outside of Bivens cases? If 
so, what role do the concepts of viewpoint discrimination and 
government speech have to play in the analysis? How does a color 
of federal law claim stand up to the President of the United States? 
Before addressing these questions, this Note must first 
determine whether, in fact, the President’s Twitter account even 
serves as a public forum. Namely, does a viewpoint discrimination 
claim have a platform, so to speak, to stand on when talking about 
the President’s Twitter account? As discussed above, when 
venturing into new areas of communicative innovation, it is 
important to keep an open mind as speech doctrine necessarily 
                                                                                                             
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
192 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395. 
193 See id. 
194 Id. 
195 See id. 
196 Chin v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1987) (emphasis added). 
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attempts to keep pace with rapidly evolving  
technological guideposts. 
II. VIEWPOINT ON THE PRESIDENT’S CONDUCT ON HIS PERSONAL 
TWITTER ACCOUNT 
The first Section of this Part opens with the initial inquiry into 
whether social media generally function as public fora, rather than 
private fora, because a viewpoint discrimination claim will not 
succeed in the latter.197 In the second Section, the analysis then 
turns to whether the President’s personal Twitter account serves as 
a public forum. Finally, in the third Section, this Part examines 
(assuming the President’s Twitter account serves as a public 
forum) whether the President violates the First Amendment for 
viewpoint discrimination when he bans constituents from his 
personal social media account because they posted messages that 
were critical of him. 
A. Social Media (Generally) Functions as a Public Forum 
In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 
the Supreme Court made clear that public fora protection extends 
beyond traditional physical spaces into metaphysical spaces.198 
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that a student-run religious 
newspaper was “a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial 
or geographic sense, but the same principles [we]re applicable.”199 
Thus, although the student newspaper at issue in that case was in 
no sense a traditional public forum—i.e., spaces comparable to 
public streets and sidewalks—the Supreme Court made clear that 
the same principles applied.200 
                                                                                                             
197 See Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (“[T]he constitutional guarantee 
of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal or state. 
Thus, while statutory or common law may in some situations extend protection or 
provide redress against a private corporation or person who seeks to abridge the free 
expression of others, no such protection or redress is provided by the Constitution 
itself.”); supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
198 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995). 
199 Id. 
200 See id. 
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The Rosenberger Court did little to explain how it came to this 
conclusion.201 What it did do was point to its decision in Lamb’s 
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District202 for 
guidance because it was the most recent and relevant case on 
point.203 Lamb’s Chapel concerned a church that wanted to use a 
school’s facilities, pursuant to the school district’s regulations, to 
publicly exhibit movies for religious purposes.204 The content of 
those movies related to education about modern family and child 
rearing issues, and the ways in which traditional Christian values 
remedied these issues.205 Despite the school regulation that school 
property could be used for social, civic, and recreational purposes, 
the local school district denied the church’s request because of the 
movies’ religious agenda.206 The church brought charges alleging, 
inter alia, that the school district had violated its freedom of speech 
while acting under color of state law.207 
The Rosenberger Court explained how, in Lamb’s Chapel, it 
had unanimously decided that it was viewpoint discrimination to 
allow all views on family issues to the exception of religious 
views.208 The aspects of Lamb’s Chapel that made it most related 
to Rosenberger were most likely the factual circumstances of a 
school restricting access to school resources on the basis of 
religious viewpoint.209 However, in Lamb’s Chapel, as opposed to 
Rosenberger, at issue was the use of a physical, rather than 
metaphysical, space.210 
The common link between the two cases, aside from the 
inherent tensions between a school and its religious community, 
rests on the restriction to use publicly available resources and 
                                                                                                             
201 See id. at 830–31. 
202 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
203 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830. 
204 See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 387–89. 
205 See id. at 388. 
206 Id. at 388–89, 391. 
207 Id. at 389. 
208 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (alteration in original) (quoting Lamb’s Chapel, 
508 U.S. at 393). 
209 See id. at 830; Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393. 
210 Compare Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (regarding use of space within a two-
dimensional newspaper), with Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 386–87 (regarding use of 
space within a three-dimensional school building). 
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property.211 One might argue that a metaphysical element in 
Lamb’s Chapel was the restriction on films, and this was what 
rendered the case most related to Rosenberger, but it makes more 
sense to view the property where the public would gather to view 
those films as the real property at issue. In fact, one falters to find 
any case relating to public fora that does not involve a restriction 
on the use of publicly accessible property or resources; despite the 
fact that the focus of the protection is on speech.212 The Internet—
and by extension social media websites—fits into this scheme, as 
social media is undoubtedly both a publicly accessible property 
and a resource.213 
Regardless of whatever the real rationale behind the 
Rosenberger decision was, metaphysical spaces can be, and are, 
treated as public fora when they fit the characteristics of one.214 
Thus, social media websites, which are themselves a metaphysical 
space,215 cannot be excluded as public fora on mere account of 
their not being actual, physical spaces.216 
If newspapers are protected as public fora, why not social 
media? Newspapers and social media have more in common every 
day. Like newspapers, social media websites do not consist of a 
physical space in the real property sense, but rather in the 
metaphysical sense, because human beings cannot physically step 
into either a newspaper or website. Additionally, social media have 
                                                                                                             
211 Compare Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (restricting school funds, both as property 
and a resource, to print student run newspaper, also as a resource and property), with 
Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393 (restricting access to school facilities, both as property 
and a resource, to play films, both as property and a resource). 
212 See supra Part I. 
213 Whether intellectual property or otherwise, social media websites are “owned” by an 
entity and are used by billions of people. See, e.g., Kurt Wagner, Who Owns Twitter? A 
Look at the Players Who Could Make or Break a Deal., RECODE (Aug. 11, 2016), 
https://www.recode.net/2016/8/11/12417064/twitter-stock-ownership-takeover-
acquisition-challenges [https://perma.cc/EA4A-RNTM]; see also Packingham v. North 
Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (noting that, according to sources cited to the 
Supreme Court, Facebook has 1.79 billion active users, which is “about three times the 
population of North America”). 
214 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830. 
215 The Author uses the term “metaphysical” in the same sense the Rosenberger Court 
did, namely, spaces that are not traditional “spatial or geographic” properties. See id. 
216 See id. 
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increasingly taken on the same functions as newspapers.217 In fact, 
a majority of Americans report using social media for their 
news.218 Twitter is no exception.219 
According to the Pew Research Center, “[s]ince 2013, at least 
half of Twitter users have reported getting news on the site, but in 
2017, with a [P]resident who frequently makes announcements on 
the platform, that share has increased to about three-quarters 
([seventy-four percent]), up [fifteen] percentage points from last 
year.”220 Thus, not only do Americans increasingly use social 
media—and Twitter more specifically—as a news source, but the 
increasing use of Twitter for news actually correlates with the 
President’s frequent use of Twitter since he took office in 2017.221 
It thus stands to reason that the President’s Twitter account, if not a 
growing news source itself, may actually be responsible for 
Twitter’s increased audience for news.222 
The Fourth Circuit has directly analogized social media to 
newspapers. In Liverman v. City of Petersburg, the court 
recognized that social media sites like Facebook are at least like 
newspapers in two respects: (1) they are spaces where news stories 
or opinions are shared with members of the community; and (2) 
individuals may submit (i.e., participate) in the content appearing 
on those spaces.223 Further, what more pertinent point of view is 
there to communicate and share than the President’s when it comes 
                                                                                                             
217 See Elisa Shearer & Jeffrey Gottfried, News Use Across Social Media Platforms 
2017, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.journalism.org/2017/09/07/news-
use-across-social-media-platforms-2017/ [https://perma.cc/44GN-P8F4]. 
218 According to a new Pew Research Center study, “[a]s of August 2017, two-thirds 
([sixty-seven percent]) of Americans report that they get at least some of their news on 
social media—with two-in-ten doing so often.” See id. 
219 See id. (describing the swell in numbers of social media users that have come to rely 
on Twitter as a source of news). 
220 See id. (emphasis added). 
221 See id. 
222 See id. Note that, while it is tempting to assume the President’s Twitter account was 
directly responsible for Twitter’s increase as a news source, the data from the Pew 
Research Center merely supports, at most, a correlation between the two. See id. 
223 See Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 410 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Facebook is 
a dynamic medium through which users can interact and share news stories or opinions 
with members of their community. Similar to writing a letter to a local newspaper, 
publicly posting on social media suggests an intent to “communicate to the public or to 
advance a political or social point of view beyond the employment context.”). 
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to politics?224 While reporters of every major newspaper in the 
United States scramble to attend White House press conferences in 
the hopes of asking a question or getting a word in with the 
President, it is the President that scrambles to Twitter.225 Twitter 
probably has more exposure to the President than the various 
traditional news outlets we would normally rely on for news about 
the President and the ways in which our federal government  
is being led.226 
That is not to say that social media are only public fora in so 
much as they are growing to resemble the same function as 
newspapers. The most authoritative source for finding that social 
media act as public fora is the Supreme Court itself. Just this year 
in Packingham v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court majority 
found that the “democratic forums of the Internet,” and social 
media in particular, constituted the most important fora for the 
exchange of views in our modern society.227 At issue in that case 
was a North Carolina law that made it a crime for registered sex 
offenders to join commercial social media where the offender has 
knowledge that minor children can become members or create 
account pages.228 In striking down the law as an unconstitutionally 
broad abrogation of free speech, the majority stressed that the law 
was a “bar to the exercise of First Amendment rights on websites 
integral to the fabric of our modern society and culture.”229 Thus, 
                                                                                                             
224 See Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 263, 264 (2006) (“[P]residents are held politically accountable for how 
the federal government as a whole functions, and in particular for how administrative 
agencies exercise their vast delegated powers.”). 
225 See Trump, supra note 5 (showing 1,376 tweets (or, Twitter posts) from the 
President this year alone since joining Twitter in January 2017). 
226 See infra note 238 and accompanying text (describing how the President posts 
tweets on Twitter on a near-daily, and sometimes near-hourly, basis); see also Stack, 
supra note 224 (noting how the President is considered accountable for the federal 
government as a whole). 
227 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (“While in the past there may have been difficulty in 
identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today 
the answer is clear. It is cyberspace—the ‘vast democratic forums of the Internet’ in 
general, and social media in particular.” (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997))). 
228 See id. at 1733 (emphasis added) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-202.5(a), (e) 
(West 2015)). 
229 See id. at 1738. 
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there exists near-explicit authority from the highest court in the 
United States that the Internet generally, and social media in 
particular, not only qualify as public fora,230 but have become 
necessary to “the exchange of views” in our culture and society.231 
Importantly, the state law at issue in Packingham prohibited 
access to commercial (i.e., for-profit) social media websites, such 
as Facebook and Twitter, and the Supreme Court still struck the 
law down as a First Amendment violation.232 Thus, even 
government restrictions to commercial website access—those 
owned by private, rather than government, entities—can rise to the 
level of a First Amendment violation.233 Viewpoint discrimination 
analysis, which concerns itself with restrictions on speech in places 
open to the public for the exchange of ideas, is readily applicable 
to commercial social media.234 
In sum it would be paradoxical to afford public forum 
protection to newspapers and not to social media.235 This is 
especially true given that public forum issues must involve a 
restriction to some kind of publicly accessible property or 
resource—of which social media is no exception.236 Further, the 
majority in the Packingham Supreme Court decision made it 
abundantly clear that they believe the Internet, and social media in 
particular, are “the most important places . . . for the exchange of 
views”—or the most important species of public fora—in modern 
society.237 Supporting this conclusion is the fact that the 
President’s Twitter posts have generated a greater reliance on 
social media as a news source this year alone, and that his heavily 
sought-after opinions are shared on a near-daily, sometimes near-
hourly, basis.238 Thus, not only should social media be considered 
                                                                                                             
230 See id. at 1735. 
231 See id. at 1738. 
232 See id. at 1733. 
233 See id. 
234 See id.; see also supra Section I.B. 
235 See supra notes 227–34 and accompanying text. 
236 See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text. 
237 Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735. 
238 See generally Trump, supra note 5 (showing December 14th posts from the 
President “9h[ours]” ago, “7h[ours]” ago, “4h[ours]” ago, “3h[ours]” ago, and similarly 
frequent posts throughout December 14th, 13th, 12th, 11th, 9th, 8th, 7th, 6th, etc.). 
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public fora, they should be considered the most important public 
fora of our time. 
While social media generally should be considered one of the 
most important public fora of our time—so much so that states 
cannot enact laws to make blanket prohibitions of their use, even 
when directed at sex offenders and commercial spaces239—that 
does not necessarily mean that individual social media accounts 
are themselves public fora. Private entities acting in their personal, 
as opposed to professional, capacity are not subject to viewpoint 
discrimination claims if they block other social media users for 
criticizing them on their social media accounts.240 This is because a 
First Amendment freedom of speech claim can only be brought 
against the government (state or federal)—the entities the First 
Amendment was meant to protect us from.241 Only the 
government, or public entities and individuals acting under the 
color of law, which attributes government action to private persons 
working in their official public capacity—specifically, only color 
of state law242—can be liable for free speech restrictions on access 
to social media.243 
Just as private persons acting in their individual capacity are 
free to restrict access to their social media, so too can social media 
websites themselves become “private,” as they are not open for 
public access or comment.244 For example, the Author’s Facebook 
                                                                                                             
239 See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738. 
240 See Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976). 
241 Id. 
242 Remember, color of federal law claims may only be brought under the Fourth 
Amendment. See supra notes 189–93 and accompanying text. Meanwhile, federal 
constitutional viewpoint discrimination claims are only brought under the First 
Amendment because they deal with restrictions of speech. See supra Section I.B. 
243 See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 513. 
244 Users of the social media website Facebook, for example, can block users from 
viewing specific social media activity like shared pictures, websites, or messages. See 
When I Post Something, How Do I Choose Who Can See It?, FAQ Question of Selecting 
an Audience for Stuff You Share, Section of Basic Privacy Settings & Tools, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/325807937506242/ [https://perma.cc/S72Y-UJBW] (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2017) (explaining how Facebook users can use the “audience selector 
tool” to choose between making certain aspects of their social media activity “public” or 
“private”). Or, they can make the entire account invisible to those they do not want to see 
it. See Who Can Search for Me?, FAQ Question of Control Who Can Find You, 
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/1718866941707011/?helpref=hc_fnav 
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account is “private” both in the sense that he does not invite the 
general public to comment on his Facebook profile, and that he has 
taken affirmative steps to block the general public from even 
viewing it by using Facebook’s privacy settings.245 Most 
importantly, though, the Author is not the government or a 
government official acting in their governmental capacity. Thus, 
viewpoint discrimination claims, and First Amendment claims 
more generally, cannot be brought against the Author for how he 
manages his personal social media accounts.246 
In conclusion, while social media as a whole is increasingly 
taking on the functions of news sources247 and may be considered 
the most important public fora of our time,248 the social media 
accounts of individuals may not serve as public fora—subject to 
viewpoint discrimination claims—where the forum belongs to 
nongovernment or non-color of law entities,249 nor where the social 
media is kept private through account settings.250 
B. The President’s Personal Twitter Account Is a Public Forum 
What is it about the personal social media accounts of those 
who happen to be government officials that makes them so 
susceptible to public forum claims? As mentioned earlier, not only 
the President, but at least four governors and a county official have 
been charged with viewpoint discrimination for blocking 
constituents that were critical of them on social media.251 The 
answer lies in the ways those public officials hold their social 
media accounts out to the public. 
Only one case so far has rendered a final judgment recognizing 
a public official’s self-expressed personal social media account as 
constituting a public forum. That case is Davison v. Loudoun 
                                                                                                             
[https://perma.cc/3CZ8-RXU6] (last visited Feb. 2, 2017) (explaining different ways to 
make your profile invisible to others). 
245 See supra note 244. 
246 See supra notes 240–43 and accompanying text. 
247 See Shearer & Gottfried, supra note 217. 
248 See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). 
249 See Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976). 
250 See supra notes 244–46 and accompanying text. 
251 See supra notes 18–19, 23 and accompanying text. 
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County Board of Supervisors.252 In Davison, the Eastern District of 
Virginia relied on Fourth Circuit jurisprudence in coming to its 
decision that the defendant’s self-expressed personal social media 
account served as a public forum.253 As the court noted, the Fourth 
Circuit had already suggested that governments can create Internet 
public fora by creating a “website that includes a ‘chat room or 
bulletin board in which private viewers could express opinions or 
post information,’ or that otherwise ‘invite[s] or allow[s] private 
persons to publish information or their positions.’”254 The court 
pointed to the following Facebook post in finding that Randall had 
affirmatively solicited the speech and viewpoints of  
her constituents: 
Everyone, could you do me a favor. I really want to 
hear from ANY Loudoun citizen on ANY issues, 
request, criticism, compliment, or just your 
thoughts. However, I really try to keep back and 
forth conversations (as opposed to one time 
information items such as road closures) on my 
county Facebook page (Chair Phyllis J. Randall) or 
County email (Phllis.randall@loudoun.gov). 
Having back and forth constituent conversations are 
Foiable (FOIA) so if you could reach out to me on 
these mediums that would be appreciated. Thanks  
much, Phyllis[.]255 
                                                                                                             
252 267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. 2017). Note that another case was decided earlier in 
the same court, with the same plaintiff, which also recognized a public official’s social 
media account to be a public forum. See Davison v. Plowman, No. 1:16CV180 
(JCC/IDD), 2017 WL 105984, at *3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2017). However, unlike in 
Davison, the public official at issue in Plowman: (1) banned the plaintiff from his official 
Commonwealth Attorney’s Facebook page, and (2) expressly admitted that the page was 
subject to a county social media policy that intended the Facebook page to serve as a 
limited public forum. See id. at *1, 3. Conversely, the defendant in Davison made clear 
that she considered her Facebook to be personal, not official. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 
3d at 711 (“Defendant contends that her ‘Chair Phyllis J. Randall’ Facebook page is 
merely a personal website that she may do with as she pleases.”). 
253 See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716. 
254 Id. (quoting Page v. Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 284  
(4th Cir. 2008)). 
255 Id. (quoting defendant). 
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The court concluded, based on the above statement, that the 
defendant-official’s deliberate designation of her Facebook page as 
a space for communication for use by the public was more than 
enough to transform it into a public forum.256 As such, even though 
the Facebook page was, allegedly, intended to be personal, it was 
nonetheless rendered a public forum of the county and thus subject 
to viewpoint discrimination claims.257 
Interestingly, the President has done the same, if not more so, 
than the defendant-official in Davison, to open his 
@realDonaldTrump Twitter account to the public, and to treat it as 
a government tool. In the pending Southern District of New York 
lawsuit against the President, both parties jointly stipulated to facts 
pointing towards the conclusion that the President had designated 
his personal Twitter account a public forum.258 A few of the more 
pertinent stipulated facts were: (1) the President had used his 
@realDonaldTrump Twitter account to communicate and interact 
with his constituents about his administration since his 
inauguration;259 (2) the President, “on occasion,” communicated 
about issues “not directly related” to his official government work 
as President;260 (3) the President’s personal Twitter account was 
“generally accessible to the public at large” with no limiting 
criteria;261 (4) the President did not use any protective measures 
(such as privacy settings) to protect any of his tweets, therefore 
anyone could view them, even without being logged in to Twitter, 
and anyone could subscribe to get updates from the account;262 (5) 
the President had no rule or statement on form or subject matter of 
                                                                                                             
256 Id. 
257 See id. 
258 See Stipulation, supra note 22, at 12. 
259 Id. 
260 Id. (emphasis added). Notably, that the President uses his personal account “on 
occasion” to discuss issues not directly related to his official government business 
indicates that the primary discussions on his account are in fact directly related to his 
official government business. See id. In fact, this is essentially what the language 
supported by the immediately preceding footnote in this Note is stating. See supra note 
259 and accompanying text. 
261 Stipulation, supra note 22, at 13 
262 Id. 
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speech to limit replies to his tweets;263 (6) earlier in the year, on 
July 2, 2017, the President tweeted (i.e., published a message)264 
from his personal Twitter account that his social media use was 
“MODERN DAY PRESIDENTIAL[,]” while, a month earlier, the 
former White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer declared at a 
press conference that tweets from the President were “official 
statements by the President of the United States”;265 (7) Dan 
Scavino, Social Media Director of the White House, promoted the 
President’s personal Twitter account (“@realDonaldTrump”), the 
President’s official government Twitter account (“@POTUS”), and 
the White House’s Twitter account (“@WhiteHouse”), as equal 
channels that the President uses to communicate “directly with 
you, the American people!”;266 (8) the White House’s Twitter 
account description stated that Twitter users should follow the 
President’s official government Twitter account, as well as his 
personal Twitter account, to get the latest news on his 
administration;267 and (9) messages from his official government 
Twitter account were “frequently” reposted from his personal 
Twitter account.268 The White House even once directed the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to the President’s 
“statement” on Twitter as an official White House Record.269 Thus, 
not only has the President had his Twitter posts self-described—or 
at least ratified—as being official, his posts are even referred to for 
use by House of Representatives Committees to further 
intragovernmental communications.270 
Also stipulated by both parties was that the President used his 
personal Twitter account “multiple times a day” to announce, 
promote, and defend his policies, legislative agenda, official 
                                                                                                             
263 Id. This means the President’s Twitter account is likely a designated public forum, 
rather than a limited one, although the distinction is moot in performing a viewpoint 
discrimination analysis because viewpoint discrimination is prohibited in all public fora. 
See supra Section I.B. 
264 See Strickland & Chandler, supra note 13 (defining “tweets”). 
265 Stipulation, supra note 22, at 13. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. at 13–14. 
268 Id. at 14. 
269 See id. 
270 See id. 
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decisions, and state visits.271 He also “engage[d]” with foreign 
leaders on the account.272 “[O]n occasion” he would make 
statements that did not relate to his official capacity as President. 
Finally, he announced official White House business on his 
personal Twitter account before other official channels.273 
It is difficult to imagine a more public social media account 
than the President’s Twitter account. As both parties stipulate, the 
number of followers—the people receiving his latest Twitter 
posts—is nearly equal to that of his “official” @POTUS and 
@WhiteHouse Twitter accounts combined.274 Of these, the only 
accounts without access are those the President has blocked.275 The 
most enlightening stipulation, though, was the first listed. Namely, 
that “President Trump has used the @realDonaldTrump account as 
a channel for communicating and interacting with the public about 
his administration.”276 This fact alone, stipulated to by both parties, 
means that unless a court is completely unwilling to view public 
fora in a social media context, the @realDonaldTrump account 
squarely falls within the definition of a designated public forum.277 
With Davison being the only case of its kind thus far, it is 
difficult to say with any certainty whether other courts outside the 
Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction will agree with the outcome in 
Davison. Regardless, for the time being, under the Davison test,278 
and most likely under the Fourth Circuit,279 the President’s Twitter 
account has, for all intents and purposes, been rendered a public 
forum. And if nothing else, it certainly fits the definition of one. 
                                                                                                             
271 See id. 
272 See id. 
273 See id. 
274 See id. at 13 (“The account has 35 million followers—16 million more than 
@POTUS and 21 million more than @WhiteHouse—as of the filing of this 
Stipulation.”). 
275 See id. 
276 See id. at 12. 
277 See supra Section I.B.2. 
278 See Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 716  
(E.D. Va. 2017). 
279 See Page v. Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 284 (4th Cir. 2008). 
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C. The President Discriminates Against Protectable Viewpoints 
on Twitter 
Even assuming, arguendo, the President’s Twitter account 
constitutes a public forum, does the President violate the First 
Amendment when banning constituents from his social  
media account? 
As discussed below, the answer largely depends on color of 
law doctrine—namely, the totality of the circumstances must 
indicate that the government official’s actions with respect to 
blocking a constituent arose out of public, not personal, 
circumstances.280 This same test, expressed another way, is that the 
government official’s apparently private actions must have a 
“sufficiently close nexus” with the government so as to be “fairly 
treated as” the actions of “the [government] itself.”281 This makes 
sense given that the purpose for the constitutional freedom of 
speech is to protect from government, not personal, abuses.282 
Thus, claims for viewpoint discrimination, which fall under the 
First Amendment freedom of speech, to have merit, must persuade 
courts that the government, not the individual, is the entity acting 
when violating plaintiffs’ rights.283 
This conundrum is exactly what the color of law doctrine is 
supposed to answer.284 It is important to note that both the state 
and federal color of law doctrines are normally unnecessary to 
bring a claim against the government for constitutional 
violations.285 However, when a plaintiff is trying to show that a 
specific individual’s actions should be interpreted as the 
government’s, especially when those actions relate to the specific 
individual’s personal social media, the color of law doctrine must 
fill the inferential gap.286 The perfect example of this is, once 
                                                                                                             
280 See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 712 (citing Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 
523 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
281 Id. (quoting Rossignol, 316 F.3d at 523). 
282 See supra notes 56–114 and accompanying text. 
283 See Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976). 
284 See supra Section I.C.2. 
285 The color of law doctrine is one way of getting at government constitutional 
violations in the civil rights context when the violator was an individual acting on behalf 
of the government. See supra Section I.C.2. 
286 See supra Section I.C.2. 
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again, the Davison case. The Davison case is particularly valuable 
in that it lays out a number of factors to consider when determining 
whether a social media account is subject to color of state law 
doctrine, and by extension, viewpoint discrimination under the 
First Amendment.287 
In pointing out the Chair of the Loudoun County Board of 
Supervisor’s efforts to “swathe the ‘Chair Phyllis J. Randall’ 
Facebook page in the trappings of her office,” weighing entirely 
towards finding applicable color of state law, the court pointed to 
the following aspects of her social media account: (1) the title of 
the account page included her official government title; (2) the 
account was listed as a government official; (3) the account 
included her official government contact information; (4) the 
account listed the web address of her official government website; 
(5) most of her posts were expressly directed at her constituents; 
(6) she had submitted posts on behalf of the governing body she 
belonged to; (7) she asked her constituents to post on her account 
for “back and forth constituent conversations”; and (8) her posts 
from the account had a strong tendency towards matters related to 
her official office.288 Each of these factors weighed towards a 
finding that the defendant-official had run the social media account 
in her professional government, rather than personal/private, 
capacity.289 This in turn opened her up to color of state law 
doctrine and viewpoint discrimination claims, specifically because 
she had run the social media account as a forum for her 
constituents while representing the county government, and while 
doing so, censored one of those constituents for criticizing how 
that government was run.290 
The court noted other aspects and circumstances playing into 
the analysis, particularly in the context of determining whether the 
official’s decision to ban the plaintiff-constituent arose out of 
“public, not personal, circumstances.”291 They are: (9) the impetus, 
                                                                                                             
287 See Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 712–14 
(E.D. Va. 2017). 
288 See id. at 714. 
289 See id. 
290 See id. 
291 See id. at 713 (quoting Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 524 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
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purpose, and timing for creating the social media account; (10) 
whether the account was used as a tool for governance; (11) 
whether government resources were used to support the account; 
and (12) whether and how often official publications from her or 
his office promoted or referenced the official’s account.292 
Finally, in noting private aspects of the official’s social media 
account, the Eastern District of Virginia pointed to: (13) whether 
the official’s enumerated duties included maintenance of a social 
media account; (14) whether the account would revert to the 
governing body when the official leaves office; (15) whether 
government-issued electronic devices were used to post to the 
social media account; and (16) whether and how much the 
official’s social media activity took place outside of her or his 
office and normal working hours.293 
By comparing the Stipulation of Facts294 with the factors 
above, one can safely conclude that the President’s Twitter account 
weighs towards a finding of acting under color of law for most of 
those factors.295 One can say with a fair degree of certainty that, 
using the President’s own stipulated to facts: (1) his Twitter posts, 
and by extension his Twitter account—which itself is essentially a 
collection of official Twitter posts that people comment on—are 
official (i.e., governmental), rather than personal;296 (2) the account 
serves as a designated public forum for constituents to 
“communicat[e] and interact[] with the public about his 
administration;”297 and (3) he banned constituents from that public 
forum on the basis of their criticism of him (i.e., their adverse 
viewpoints).298 The President, if he can be linked in his official 
capacity to the public nature of his personal Twitter account, 
through another mechanism than the color of law doctrine, violates 
                                                                                                             
292 See id. 
293 See id. at 712. 
294 See generally Stipulation, supra note 22 (laying out uncontested facts both plaintiffs 
and defendants agree to). 
295 See supra notes 259–68 and accompanying text. Factors not implicated by the 
sample of stipulated facts listed above are all mostly addressed in the Knight Institute 
stipulation. See generally Stipulation, supra note 22. 
296 See supra notes 259–68 and accompanying text. 
297 Stipulation, supra note 22, at 12 
298 See id. at 1. 
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the First Amendment freedom of speech when blocking 
constituents from his Twitter account for their adverse 
viewpoints—at least in every situation where an exception, such as 
speech unworthy of protection (e.g., fighting words, etc.) is  
not at play.299 
It should be noted that because the color of law claims are 
based on the totality of the circumstances, the factors addressed 
above are neither dispositive nor exclusive to the issue of whether 
an official committed viewpoint discrimination in banning a 
constituent from their personal social media account.300 Further 
complicating the issue is the fact that the above factors were used 
in a color of state law analysis,301 whereas the President is a federal 
public official. This means the President’s actions would have to 
be analyzed under color of federal law, rather than color of state 
law, doctrine. In other words, the President cannot be held liable 
under either theory of the color of law doctrine because color of 
federal law only applies to cases involving a Fourth, rather than 
First, Amendment violation.302 
In sum, a color of law doctrine claim will fail against the 
President where it succeeded against the defendant-official in 
Davison.303 While color of state law doctrine provides an answer to 
viewpoint discrimination claims against state and local officials 
when banning constituents from their personal social media 
accounts, color of federal law doctrine simply does not afford the 
same protection when confronting federal officials.304 As already 
mentioned, however, the President’s Twitter account would qualify 
as a public forum, which means other avenues may exist to find the 
President liable for viewpoint discrimination claims on his 
personal Twitter account.305 It is just that the color of law 
                                                                                                             
299 See supra Sections I.A–B and notes 59–68. 
300 See, e.g., Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 292 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[T]here is ‘no specific 
formula’ for determining whether state action is present.” (quoting Hicks v. S. Md. 
Health Sys. Agency, 737 F.2d 399, 402 n.3 (4th Cir. 1984))). 
301 See Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 711–14 
(E.D. Va. 2017). 
302 See supra notes 187–93 and accompanying text. 
303 See supra notes 187–93 and accompanying text. 
304 See supra notes 187–93 and accompanying text. 
305 See supra note 285 and accompanying text. 
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mechanism from the Davison analysis will be inapplicable when 
the case goes to trial.306 
What may remain applicable from Davison as a pioneering 
case to the Knight Institute claim, however, are the various factors 
the court looked to when deciding whether the forum was of a 
pubic, rather than private, character.307 As discussed in Section I.B, 
if the government opens a forum to the general public for speech, 
as the President did with his personal Twitter account,308 then that 
forum is subject to viewpoint discrimination claims.309 
III. PROPOSAL 
The President’s explicit use of his personal Twitter account for 
official purposes largely resolved the conundrum addressed in Part 
II of this Note because the account is self-avowedly an official 
government forum.310 Nonetheless, absent explicit evidence of 
using social media for official government use, the reality is that 
the color of federal law doctrine remains inapplicable to viewpoint 
discrimination. As discussed above, viewpoint discrimination 
claims for social media require: (1) a public forum; (2) a 
viewpoint-based restriction on use of the public forum; and (3) a 
                                                                                                             
306 See generally supra Section I.C.2 (describing both color of law doctrines and how 
color of state law doctrine was relied on in the Davison analysis). 
307 See supra notes 288–93 and accompanying text. While most of the Davison factors 
were used in the color of state law analysis, they are also useful at examining whether the 
President’s personal Twitter account was operated primarily as a public, rather than 
private, resource. Compare Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 
702, 711–14 (E.D. Va. 2017) (discussing factors useful for distinguishing between 
whether a social media account was of a governmental, rather than private, character), 
with Sections I.B.1–4 (discussing how if the government opens a forum for a public 
purpose, depending on the types of limitations government imposes on that forum, it is 
subject to different freedom of speech protections). 
308 See supra notes 259–68 and accompanying text. 
309 See Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. Five, 470 F.3d 
1062, 1067 n.2 (4th Cir. 2006) (“The ‘viewpoint discrimination’ prohibited in all fora is 
‘an egregious form of content discrimination’ in which the government ‘targets not 
subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject.’” (emphasis added) 
(citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995))). 
310 See supra notes 259–73 and accompanying text. 
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government defendant or a government official acting within the 
trappings of their office.311 
In Davison, the third element above was found through an 
application of the color of state law doctrine.312 By holding that the 
Chairwoman in Davison had acted under color of state law, the 
court found that the constitutional viewpoint discrimination claim 
could stick because the Chairwoman had acted in the role of her 
office.313 Without a comparable doctrine available for First 
Amendment claims—given that, the color of federal law doctrine 
only supports causes of action under the Fourth Amendment314—
what options are available to viewpoint discrimination claimants 
seeking redress against federal public officials who are not as 
candid as the President concerning their official use of their social 
media accounts? 
Section III.A discusses U.S. District Judge Naomi Reice 
Buchwald’s recommendation concerning how to resolve the 
dispute in Trump. Section III.B examines Twitter’s Terms and 
Conditions for any information that might be useful to a court in 
determining how to address the question presented by Part II. 
Section III.C discusses the existence of social media best practices 
disseminated by federal agencies. Finally, Section III.D discusses 
the merits of treating the relationship between an elected official 
and his or her constituents as a fiduciary relationship, such as 
between lawyer and client. 
A. Judge Buchwald’s Recommendation in Trump 
According to Judge Buchwald, who heard arguments from 
lawyers for both the President and Knight Institute in Trump, the 
President should “mute” rather than “block” critical posts he finds 
unwelcome.315 When a Twitter user “mutes” another Twitter user, 
                                                                                                             
311 See supra notes 108–13, 239–50 and accompanying text. 
312 See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 714. 
313 See id. 
314 See supra notes 187–93. 
315 Transcript of Oral Argument at 30–33, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Colum. 
Univ. v. Trump, No.17-cv-05205 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2018); see also Larry 
Neumeister, Judge to Trump: Muting, Not Blocking Followers, May End Suit, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 9, 2018), https://apnews.com/e524e6eda0d84d4ca6c8e1ebd
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the other user’s messages are hidden from the account holder 
without actually blocking or stopping the muted person’s access to 
view or post to the account.316 Blocking the account, on the other 
hand, prevents the blocked user from viewing posts, accessing the 
account, seeing basic information associated with the account, such 
as the list of people and posts the account is associated with, and 
information about people following the account for updates.317 If 
the President muted an account, then, the muted constituent could 
still participate in political discourse in that forum, just without 
being seen or heard by the President himself.318 
For example, if the President decided to mute a constituent on 
Twitter, the constituent could still follow the President’s Twitter 
account, post replies to the President’s posts, and read what is on 
the President’s account.319 Thus, the constituent can still participate 
in communicating with and viewing the President’s account.320 
However, unbeknownst to the constituent, the President cannot see 
anything posted by the constituent once the constituent has been 
muted.321 The constituent’s post is still there for the world to see, 
but not for the President to see.322 However, if the President had 
blocked the constituent instead, the constituent would not be able 
to view the President’s account, post replies to the President’s 
posts, or follow the President’s account for updates.323 Thus, the 
constituent would be effectively locked out of perhaps one of the 
most personal and frequent utilities the leader of the nation, the 
President, uses to communicate with and update the public.324 
                                                                                                             
255f8d9?utm_campaign=SocialFlow&utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=AP 
[https://perma.cc/LDK5-H98L]. 
316 See How to Mute Accounts on Twitter, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://help.twitter.com/
en/using-twitter/twitter-mute [https://perma.cc/9YH3-9JF7] (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
317 See How to Control Your Twitter Experience, TWITTER HELP CTR., 
https://help.twitter.com/en/safety-and-security/control-your-twitter-experience 
[https://perma.cc/8S5F-59YS] (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
318 See id.; How to Mute Accounts on Twitter, supra note 316. 
319 See How to Mute Accounts on Twitter, supra note 316. 
320 See id. 
321 See id. 
322 See id. 
323 See How to Control Your Twitter Experience, supra note 317. 
324 See id. 
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Muting may appease both the critical constituent, who wants 
participate in political discourse on the President’s account, and the 
President, who does not want to see the constituent’s criticism.325 
This is, assuming of course, the constituent is trying to reach 
people other than the President on the account, and that the 
President is more concerned with himself not seeing the message, 
rather than the general public with access to his account.326 Such a 
solution settles the constitutional claims regardless, however, as 
constituents do not have the right to be seen or heard by the 
President, and the President cannot stop users from hearing 
another’s viewpoint in a public forum (in this case, his  
Twitter account).327 
It remains to be seen whether, after consulting with their 
clients, lawyers for either side will accept Judge Buchwald’s 
recommendation and settle the case, as the judge hopes.328 If not, 
Judge Buchwald has cautioned that both parties may receive an 
outcome they will not like.329 Unfortunately, Judge Buchwald’s 
recommendation sounds more like an ultimatum than a promise to 
clear up a confusing and new area of the law.330 What if “muting” 
is not an option on social media, or what if a federal official 
refuses to mute, and continues to block? What is the appropriate 
outcome then? It seems an answer unfriendly to both parties in 
Trump may be forthcoming should the parties refuse to settle on 
the judge’s recommendation.331 
B. Twitter’s Terms and Conditions 
What does Twitter have to say about all this? According to 
Twitter’s Terms of Service, if any “federal, state, or local 
government entity in the United States using the Services in [its] 
                                                                                                             
325 See id.; How to Mute Accounts on Twitter, supra note 316. 
326 See How to Control Your Twitter Experience, supra note 317; How to Mute 
Accounts on Twitter, supra note 316. 
327 See generally supra Parts I–II. 
328 See Transcript of Oral Argument supra note 315, at 33; Neumeister, supra note 315. 
329 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 315, at 33; Neumeister, supra  
note 315. 
330 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 315, at 33; Neumeister, supra  
note 315. 
331 See Neumeister, supra note 315. 
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official capacity” cannot legally accept Twitter’s terms, then those 
terms do not apply to those entities.332 Any lawsuits brought 
relating to those terms are instead governed by U.S. federal law 
where applicable, and California state law where inapplicable.333 
Notably, Twitter is aware of the distinction between government 
entities using its services in an official versus an unofficial 
capacity.334 It is thus false to assume that just because the platform 
is Twitter, conduct by a government official on that platform is 
somehow less official—at least according to Twitter.335 Further, 
Twitter’s terms that might cause or enable a government official to 
commit viewpoint discrimination on Twitter are rendered 
inapplicable because these do not apply when the government 
cannot legally accept them; as the government cannot legally 
accept viewpoint discrimination in a governmental public forum.336 
In sum, the government cannot hypothetically cite to Twitter’s 
terms as a reason to break the law, nor as a reason to doubt the 
official nature of the posts by government officials on there.337 
Twitter’s Terms of Service also states: 
You understand that by using the Services, you may 
be exposed to Content that might be offensive, 
harmful, inaccurate or otherwise inappropriate . . . . 
All Content is the sole responsibility of the person 
who originated such Content. We may not monitor 
or control the Content posted via the Services and, 
we cannot take responsibility for such Content.338 
This indicates that Twitter also claims no responsibility when it 
comes to monitoring or controlling content others might find 
offensive.339 Thus, Twitter claims no obligation to police what 
                                                                                                             
332 If You Live in the United States, Section of Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, 
https://twitter.com/en/tos [https://perma.cc/9C5Z-TZW6] (last visited Apr. 2, 2018) 
(emphasis added). 
333 See id. 
334 See id. 
335 See id. 
336 See id. 
337 See id. 
338 Id. 
339 See id. 
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people say on the President’s Twitter account, nor an obligation to 
police when the President blocks content.340 
Overall, Twitter has an apparent laissez-faire (hands-off) role 
in how government officials use their services, so long as the 
government is not breaking the law while using them.341 Under 
these terms, Twitter disclaims responsibility from monitoring 
posted content, including what constituents might post on a 
government official’s Twitter account, or what posts might be 
blocked by that same Twitter account.342 Twitter also 
acknowledges that government entities might use their services in 
their official capacity.343 These insights from Twitter may be 
useful to courts considering these questions from a contractual 
point of view: whether government officials, including the 
President, can break the law when using its services; whether 
Twitter should stay out of such a dispute; and whether Twitter can 
be used for official government purposes. After all, Twitter’s 
Terms and Conditions, its contract with its users, certainly states 
that all three are possible.344 
C. Social Media Best Practices from Federal Agencies 
Several federal agencies have already disseminated their own 
best practices as related to social media use by their employees in 
relation to the agency. For example, the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention has a variety of materials that govern its 
social media presence, specifically through its employees.345 They 
have a standalone Twitter guide and a standalone Facebook guide, 
in addition to their general social media policy.346 The social media 
policy goes into great length about what is considered official 
social media behavior taken on behalf of the agency itself, and 
what is personal social media behavior, as well as the agency’s 
                                                                                                             
340 See id. 
341 See id. 
342 See id. 
343 See id. 
344 See id. 
345 See CDC Social Media Tools, Guidelines & Best Practices, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/socialmedia/tools/guidelines/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/4UGT-9E9T]. 
346 See id. 
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expectations regarding the two.347 The same holds true of the 
social media policies for the Food and Drug Administration,348 the 
Department of Energy,349 the Office of Personnel Management,350 
the Department of the Interior,351 and the General  
Service Administration.352 
While this Note has not reviewed the full list of federal agency 
social media policies available,353 the above sample reflects that 
federal agencies are aware of the important distinction between 
official versus personal use of social media by their employees.354 
Each of the policies surveyed above go to great pains to make clear 
what they find constitutes acceptable official versus personal social 
media activity by their employees.355 
The White House might well consider implementing its own 
official social media policy—one that prescribes what amounts to 
official versus personal social media activity by its employees, 
including the President and those that may tweet on his behalf. 
However, while such a policy might clear up what the government 
views pertaining to its social media, it is unlikely to clear up the 
law on whether—should an official fail to follow the policy—a 
                                                                                                             
347 See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CDC-GA-2011-01, CDC 
ENTERPRISE SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY 2–6 (2015), https://www.cdc.gov/socialmedia/
tools/guidelines/pdf/social-media-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5K9-HJXN]. 
348 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION SOCIAL 
MEDIA POLICY 4–6 (2015), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/
AboutThisWebsite/WebsitePolicies/UCM472486.pdf [https://perma.cc/KW9X-XFUY]. 
349 See Best Practices, Subsection of Social Media Policy, DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
https://www.energy.gov/about-us/web-policies/social-media [https://perma.cc/82Q2-
JR4C] (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
350 See U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY 7–15 (2015), 
https://www.opm.gov/news/social-media-presence/social-media-policy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5CL2-AXU4]. 
351 See DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY 3–5 (2010), https://www.doi.gov/
notices/Social-Media-Policy [https://perma.cc/997V-6KUQ]. 
352 See GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., CIO 2106.1, GSA ORDER, SUBJECT: GSA SOCIAL MEDIA 
POLICY § 5 (2009), https://www.gsa.gov/about-us/newsroom/social-media/gsa-social-
media-policy [https://perma.cc/54CX-CQJT]. 
353 See, e.g., Ines Mergel, Social Media Policies, WORD PRESS: DIGITAL INNOVATIONS 
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (Oct. 10, 2011), https://inesmergel.wordpress.com/research/social-
media-policies/ [https://perma.cc/G5JH-6E9Z]. 
354 See supra notes 345–52 and accompanying text. 
355 See supra notes 345–52 and accompanying text. 
2018] PUBLIC FORA PURPOSE 567 
 
federal official will be held liable for viewpoint discrimination 
committed on their social media account. 
D. Principal-Agent Relationship 
Finally, one answer is to recognize an exception allowing a 
new use of color of federal law doctrine. The issue for the public is 
how to recognize when federal public officials are acting within 
the trappings of their office under allegedly personal 
circumstances, and how to hold the government accountable for 
when those public officials abuse their office to abrogate the 
constitutional rights of others under the guise of personal, not 
public, pretenses. 
In pondering these issues, consider the duties lawyers owe to 
prospective clients under section 14 of the Third Restatement of 
the Law Governing Lawyers (the “Restatement”),356 stating: 
A relationship of client and lawyer arises when: (1) 
a person manifests to a lawyer the person’s intent 
that the lawyer provide legal services for the person; 
and either (a) the lawyer manifests to the person 
consent to do so; or (b) the lawyer fails to manifest 
lack of consent to do so, and the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know that the person reasonably 
relies on the lawyer to provide the services; or (2) a 
tribunal with power to do so appoints the lawyer to 
provide the services.357 
In a comment dedicated to the rationale behind this rule, the 
Restatement makes clear that lawyers should be “held to 
responsibility of representation when the client reasonably relies 
on the existence of the relationship.”358 It is this aspect of the rule 
in particular that could provide a solution to the issue of 
ambiguous federal public official activity in cases where the line 
between official and personal action is murky. 
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A rule that would address the glaring pocket of absent 
protection discussed earlier in this Part might look similar to that 
of the Restatement’s section 14: 
A federal official acts in their official capacity on 
behalf of the government when: (1) a person 
manifests to the official the person’s belief that the 
official is acting in their official capacity; and either 
(a) the official manifests to the person consent that 
they are; or (b) the official fails to manifest lack of 
consent that they are, and the official knows or 
reasonably should know that the person reasonably 
relies on the official’s actions as representative of 
the government’s; or (2) an agency or branch of 
government with power to do so specifies a 
circumstance under which the official is deemed to 
have acted in their official capacity on behalf of  
the government. 
Under such a rule, public federal officials are held to their 
actions that provoke reasonable reliance from others that they are 
indeed acting in their official capacity. Assume the President had 
not admitted to using his personal Twitter account for primarily 
official purposes. If others reasonably relied on his representation 
(though non-explicit) that his personal Twitter account was 
official, plaintiffs bringing a viewpoint discrimination claim would 
be entitled to rely on the official representation of the account as 
governmental, thus opening the doors to a constitutional claim 
against the government. 
While some might argue that a public official’s relationship 
with their constituents is of a different nature than that of a 
lawyer’s relationship with their clients—which is admittedly 
true—more than a few similarities exist. For one, just as lawyers 
are the agents and fiduciaries of their clients,359 so too should 
public officials be the fiduciaries of their constituents. It is 
axiomatic that public officials are elected by their constituents to 
represent their interests in government. It is not a grand leap to 
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suggest that such a duty includes an agency relationship, with 
constituents acting as the principal. 
Judge Posner, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit decision Burdett v. Miller, explained that “[a] fiduciary 
duty is the duty of an agent to treat his principal with the utmost 
candor, rectitude, care, loyalty, and good faith—in fact to treat the 
principal as well as the agent would treat himself.”360 He went on 
to explain that “[t]he common law imposes that duty when the 
disparity between the parties in knowledge or power relevant to the 
performance of an undertaking is so vast that . . . otherwise the 
principal would be placing himself at the agent’s mercy.”361 He 
provides examples of fiduciary duty, such as a guardian and his 
minor ward, or a lawyer and his client.362 
Does not a federal public official, an employee of the 
government that protects us, owe a duty similar to that of a 
fiduciary duty, namely, to treat their electing constituents “with the 
utmost candor, rectitude, care, loyalty and good faith”?363 While 
many might grouse that federal officials, much less politicians, 
have hardly a reputation for their candor and rectitude, loyalty and 
good faith, this only provokes a stronger rationale for imposing the 
duty in the first place. Lawyers too have hardly the glittering 
reputation in popular culture lately, but as Judge Posner pointed 
out, the disparity between their knowledge and power and the 
client’s in legal matters necessitates that they behave according to 
the fiduciary duty.364 Otherwise, a client would be at the lawyer’s 
mercy in all legal matters brought to the lawyer’s attention.365 
So too is there a large disparity between the power and 
knowledge a federal public official has over a constituent’s in 
matters of governance and politics. Constituents are at the public 
official’s mercy, with little authority and resources to provide 
meaningful oversight over, say, a governor or the President. Thus, 
this Note suggests that rules should be crafted tightening the 
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fiduciary relationship between a federal public official and the 
constituents they govern for the constituents’ benefit. 
This Note does not have the time nor resources to dig into an 
overhaul of political accountability to constituents. Rather, it 
merely provides a survey of a range of factors for courts to 
consider when taking on a government social media viewpoint 
discrimination claim. These factors included the Davison factors 
from Section II.C, Judge Buchwald’s recommendation in Section 
III.A, Twitter’s Terms and Conditions policy from Section III.B, 
the social media best practices for several federal agencies in 
Section III.C, and the benefits of treating elected public officials as 
the fiduciaries of their constituents discussed in Section III.D. 
CONCLUSION 
As discussed in the Parts above, the President’s personal social 
media account functions as a designated public forum and the 
President practiced viewpoint discrimination in maintaining that 
forum. Courts will find that the recent Davison decision, while 
instructive, uses a method to get at the government action element 
of a viewpoint discrimination claim that cannot be applied to the 
President. However, a color of law theory is unnecessary in the 
context of the President’s Twitter activities, given his defense 
team’s stipulation to facts that the President primarily uses his 
personal Twitter account for official purposes. Thus, the 
President’s personal Twitter account is self-avowedly official, 
attributed to his governmental office, and open to constitutional 
protection on viewpoint discrimination grounds. It remains, 
however, to be seen how the problem in Part II of this Note would 
be resolved if the President had not explicitly marked his own 
Twitter posts as being official. What would fill the gap in the 
Davison color of law analysis? As suggested in Part III of this 
Note, there are a variety of sources for courts to look to when 
considering a creative solution to this latest problem in free  
speech cases. 
